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ABSTRACT
This research focused on the development of a model that predicts improved 
organizational outcomes associated with higher wage rates or, more narrowly, 
efficiency wages. The model is premised on efficiency wage theory, namely, that 
higher wages will translate into improved service quality, lower turnover or quit rates, 
fewer employee accountability control mechanisms, and, ultimately, lower wage costs. 
Through an empirical analysis involving municipalities located throughout the Chicago 
suburban metropolitan area (SMA), the major theoretical underpinnings associated with 
efficiency wage theory were tested. Two separate written survey instruments were 
distributed to municipalities in the Chicago SMA: a salary and fringe benefits survey 
and a reputational service quality questionnaire. Generally speaking, the surveys 
provided a broad array of quantifiable data pertaining to a municipality’s pay strategy, 
current wage levels, and perceived level of performance. In addition, a case study 
analysis demonstrating how an actual efficiency wage system functions in a public- 
sector organization was conducted.
The findings of this research indicate that efficiency wage rates are a significant 
predictor o f  increased reputational service quality. Municipal size (population) and 
affluence (per capita income) were also found to be associated with service quality. In 
addition, higher wages were found to be a significant predictor of wage costs per 
employee; however, this relationship was not in the expected direction. No definitive
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evidence was found in support of the hypotheses regarding accountability control 
mechanisms.
One implication of this research is that highly regarded municipalities may be 
able to leverage their reputation as a tool for increasing economic development or 
attracting more affluent residents to the community. Municipalities may also be able to 
use their reputation as a vehicle for attracting and retaining employees to the 
organization. This research concludes with a discussion of the future of public-sector 
compensation and the potential for a model based on efficiency wage rates to be utilized 
in pursuit of improved organizational outcomes. A research agenda for following up on 
what has already been completed is also provided.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
PLAYING THE EXTERNAL MARKET: EFFICIENCY WAGE AS A MEANS 
FOR STRATEGIC COMPENSATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL 
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE RESQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY





Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
UMI Number: 3272148
INFORMATION TO USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy 
submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and 
photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper 
alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized 
copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
®
UMI
UMI Microform 3272148 
Copyright 2007 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. 
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest Information and Learning Company 
300 North Zeeb Road 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Certification: In accordance with departmental and Graduate 
School policies, this dissertation is accepted in 
partial fulfillment of degree requirements.
Dissertation Director
ANY USE O F MATERIAL CONTAINED 
INCLUDED IN A PUBLICATION.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Without the guidance and support of numerous individuals, I simply would not 
have been able to complete this dissertation. I would like to express my deepest 
gratitude to my mentor and friend, Dr. Gerald T. Gabris, for his unyielding support, 
excellent guidance, and commitment to this project and my development as a scholar. I 
am also grateful to the other members of my committee, Professors Curtis H. Wood and 
Kurt Thurmaier, for generously giving their time and expertise to better my work.
In addition, my work has benefited from conversations with and guidance from 
numerous colleagues and friends. I am especially grateful to Brian Frederick for 
lending me his expertise, Casey LaFrance for always making me laugh, and LeAnn 
Beaty for her willingness to listen and to provide me with sound advice.
This dissertation would not have been possible without the help and unwavering 
support of my wife, Sarah. Not only did Sarah share in all of the ups and downs that go 
along with the dissertation process, but she did so while tolerating my many physical 
and emotional absences. Finally, I am indebted to my parents, Jay and Tana, for 
believing I could do whatever I set my mind to and for being proud of me regardless of 
the outcome.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES .....................................................................................................  vii
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................  viii
LIST OF APPENDICES ............................................................................................  ix
Chapter
1. SETTING THE FOUNDATION .....................................................................  1
Contemplating Public-Sector Compensation Practices
and Reform .......................................    1
Efficiency Wage Theory: A Brief Overview ..................................  4
Practical Advantages and Disadvantages Associated with
Efficiency Wage Theory ......................................................  6
The Research Context ........................................................................ 10
Study Components ....................................................................... 11
Methodological Advantages and Hurdles .................................  14
A Model for Understanding Improved Organizational Outcomes
Associated with Efficiency Wage Rates ...................................  17
Research Hypotheses ......................................................................... 20
Organization for This Dissertation ..........................................................  21
2. EFFICIENCY WAGE THEORY: LINKING WAGES TO IMPROVED
ORGANZATIONAL OUTCOMES ..........................................................  24
Equity Considerations ........................................................................ 24
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
VChapter Page
The External Market .......................................................................... 26
Overview of Efficiency Wage Models and Empirical Findings .... 28
Efficiency Wage Models ............................................................. 29
Empirical Findings .....................................................................  36
Conclusion .........................................................................................  52
3. DEVELOPING THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ...............................  54
Study Design and Method of Research ...........................................  54
Selection of the Sample ....................................................................  55
Survey Questionnaires ......................................................................  57
Salary and Fringe Benefits Survey ............................................  59
Reputational Service Quality Questionnaire ............................. 63
Sociodemographic Information ........................................................  65
Research Variables, Hypotheses, and Statistical Models ............... 66
Research Variables .....................................................................  66
Research Hypotheses ..................................................................  68
Statistical Models ........................................................................ 71
Case Study Analysis .......................................................................... 74
Timing of Implementation ................................................................  77
Strengths and Weaknesses of This Design .....................................  78
Conclusion .........................................................................................  83
4. RESEARCH FINDINGS: PUTTING EFFICIENCY WAGE THEORY
TO THE TEST ............................................................................................  84
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
vi
Chapter Page
Sociodemographic Data ....................................................................  86
Correlational Analysis Testing Efficiency Wage Assumptions ..... 87
Hypothesis Testing Using Ordinary Least Squares
Multiple Regression ....................................................................  90
Predicting Reputational Service Quality (RSQ) Score ............  91
Predicting Turnover or Quit Rate ..............................................  98
Predicting Accountability Control Mechanisms ......................  101
Predicting Wage Costs per Employee ....................................... 103
Conclusion .........................................................................................  105
5. THE POTENTIAL FOR AN EFFICIENCY WAGE STRATEGY
TO FUNCTION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR ..........................................  107
Implications of the Research Findings ............................................  108
Assessing the Model for Understanding Improved
Organizational Outcomes Associated with Efficiency
Wage Rates ................................................................................... 112
Case Study Analysis: St. Charles, Illinois ....................................... 114
Final Observations and Conclusion .................................................. 126
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................ 131
APPENDICES ...........................   140
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Sociodemographic Characteristics of Sample Municipalities .....................  14
2. Number of Municipal Locations by County .................................................. 56
3. Chicago SMA Regional Wage Benchmark and Wage Ratio ......................  62
4. Sociodemographics of Municipalities in Study Sample ..............................  87
5. Correlations of Market Wage Ratio and Core Assumptions...........................  88
6. Regression Analysis Predicting Reputational Service
Quality (RSQ) Score ...................................................................................... 92
7. Regression Analysis Predicting Reputational Service
Quality (RSQ) Score at Efficiency Wage Rate Tipping Points .................. 96
8. Regression Analysis Predicting Turnover or Quit Rate ...............................  99
9. Regression Analysis Predicting Accountability Control Mechanisms .......  102
10. Regression Analysis Predicting Wage Costs per Employee ........................ 104
11. Socioeconomic and Demographic Data for St. Charles, Illinois .................  114
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
1. A Model for Understanding Improved Organizational
Outcomes Associated with Efficiency Wage Rates ..................................... 18
2. Chicago SMA Responding Municipalities ....................................................  58
3. Scatterplot of Reputational Service Quality (RSQ) Score and
Market Wage Ratio .........................................................................................  95
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
LIST OF APPENDICES
Appendix Page
A. BENCHMARK JOBS SURVEYED ............................................................. 140
B. CORE MUNICIPAL SERVICE AREAS SURVEYED ...............................  142
C. ALPHABETICAL LISTING OF STUDY MUNICIPALITIES ................. 144
D. SALARY AND FRINGE BENEFITS SURVEY .........................................  146
E. REPUTATIONAL SERVICE QUALITY QUESTIONNAIRE ................. 153
F. COMPARABLE COMMUNITIES FOR THE CITY OF
ST. CHARLES, ILLINOIS ...........................................................................  156
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTERI 
SETTING THE FOUNDATION
Contemplating Public-Sector Compensation Practices and Reform
On average, compensation costs account for 65% to 70% of the total costs in the 
U.S. economy (Blinder, 1990; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2006). Moreover, total 
compensation costs doubled from June 1981 to December 1997, with state and local 
government employees outpacing private-sector workers 121% to 98%, respectively 
(U.S. Department of Labor, 1998). Simply put, compensation matters. It is, thus, not 
surprising that the type of compensation system or philosophy utilized by an 
organization plays an important role in determining the overall level of efficiency and 
effectiveness in which it operates.
Compensation systems do not exist in a vacuum. At a very basic level, an 
organization’s compensation system reflects a reasoned strategy on the part of 
organizational decision makers regarding how vigorously an organization is going to 
compete within a competitive and constantly shifting marketplace. In the public sector, 
this often involves deliberative decisions by appointed or elected policy boards, acting 
upon the recommendations of professional administrative staff. Over time, creative 
thinking by both public- and private-sector managers has created theories of
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compensation that purport to increase employee motivation, job satisfaction, and, in 
turn, organizational performance and productivity.
In the public sector, the dominant compensation system or philosophy has 
generally centered on two basic concepts: the classic civil service pay system and 
performance-based (or merit) pay. Under the classic civil service pay system 
employees are classified or categorized into specific grades and steps determined in part 
by rank, function, and seniority. These grades and steps are then connected to specific 
pay scales and ranges, which are rigidly applied and rarely deviated from. Employees 
at the same grade and step throughout an organization, although performing 
substantively different jobs, should receive approximately the same pay. Thus, the 
classic civil service pay system strives to maximize internal equity (Wallace & Fay,
1988) while simultaneously rewarding long-tenured employees with automatic step 
increments. Such a system, however, does little, if anything, to enhance individual 
employee performance.
During the 1970s and 1980s, performance-based pay emerged as an impetus for 
increasing employee performance and productivity. Following on the heels of the 1978 
Civil Service Reform Act (Ingraham & Ban, 1984), merit pay became a near iconic 
innovation in the public sector. Although Frederick Thayer's (1978) prediction that this 
touted reform was misguided and headed toward disaster has been vindicated by various 
studies at the local, state, and federal levels (Gabris & Mitchell, 1985, 1988; Kellough 
& Lu, 1993; Kellough & Selden, 1997; Pearce, Stevenson, & Perry, 1985; Perry, 1986), 
merit pay, in various guises, remains a popular tool because of its perceived ability to 
control and punish inept employees (Gabris, 1998). Others have argued, as well as
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presented some empirical evidence, that performance pay can work under specific 
conditions (Gabris & Ihrke, 2000; Heneman, 1992). Even so, merit pay has lost the 
spotlight.
The numerous pitfalls associated with the classic civil service pay system and 
performance-based pay are not the intended focus of this dissertation; several notable 
researchers have already placed these concerns at the forefront of the compensation 
debate. Rather, this research attempts to redirect the debate by focusing on the payment 
of higher wages as a compensation strategy and the outcomes of this strategy as they 
relate to the primary tenets of efficiency wage theory. Specifically, this research 
purports to answer the question: “Does the relative placement of a public organization 
within an external compensation market have much effect on how successful it might be 
in producing desirable organizational outcomes?” Put another way, to what degree does 
external equity associate with employee behaviors and performance levels that public 
organizations would deem indicative of effectiveness and efficiency?
Although this query may appear straightforward, a review of the public 
administration literature over the past two decades does not produce much in the way of 
meaningful research about public-sector pay markets and how these markets may be 
associated with broad measures of organizational performance or service quality. The 
research that goes beyond merit pay does posit several intriguing compensation 
strategies, however. For instance, Thompson and LeHew (2000) make a solid case 
describing the benefits of skill-based pay.
Under a skill-based system, employees are rewarded horizontally through the 
expansion of their knowledge, skills, and abilities that facilitate their specific job
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expertise. Wallace and Fay (1988), however, point out that skill-based systems often 
suffer from: (1) narrow pay ranges, causing employees to quickly “top out” on the pay 
scale; (2) an inadequate process of defining and measuring various qualification levels, 
transforming the pay plan into a mere credentialing scheme for employees to qualify for 
higher wages; and (3) greater employee training costs, making employee turnover ever 
more costly. Moreover, skill-based systems are in direct conflict with traditional job 
evaluation plans where a worker’s pay is based on the job held rather than his or her 
individual skill set. Ultimately, however, exactly how or whether skill-based pay 
systems correlate with significant organizational performance increases has yet to be the 
subject of extensive empirical research.
Another general compensation strategy that has received some attention 
involves broad "pay bands" (Naff, 2003). Pay bands, in contrast to "pay grades,” create 
a much wider pay range for hiring employees at competitive market rates. If its pay 
range is too narrow, a public organization risks being unable to attract high-quality 
applicants or retain marketable employees who are likely to jump the fence for greener 
pastures in the private sector. By all estimations, broad banding makes sense because it 
expands the flexibility of public organizations to be more competitive in complex labor 
markets. Moreover, broad banding relates to the central focus of this dissertation, 
namely, the theory and practice of "efficiency wage.”
Efficiency Wage Theory: A Brief Overview
In its simplest description, efficiency wage theory involves the notion that 
“paying above-market rates might help organizations realize increased effectiveness”
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(Gerhart & Rynes, 2003, p. 22). An early version of this theory (Yellen, 1984) 
suggested that some organizations may be willing to pay above-average market wages 
in order to create a psychological expectation among employees that higher pay 
necessitates harder work. Higher rates of pay may also lead to better applicant pools 
and longer employee retention. For instance, Krueger (1988) found that the number of 
applications as well as the quality of the applicants for public-sector jobs increased as 
the ratio of public-to-private-sector pay increased. Holzer (1990), moreover, found that 
increased wages led to contracted vacancy rates, enhanced the perceived ease of hiring, 
and reduced the time devoted to informal training. Finally, higher pay may not only 
lead to better initial applicant pools but may reduce turnover or quit rates compared to 
organizations paying less (Ehrenberg & Smith, 1988). Building on the above ideas, an 
organization utilizing an efficiency wage strategy may:
1. Experience lower turnover in employees, therefore reducing the need for additional 
training costs.
2. Experience less need to monitor employee performance and work quality, 
translating into fewer supervisors.
3. Increase employee competency for multitasking and teamwork, resulting in a need 
for fewer overall employees.
An example of this type of compensation strategy can be seen in Henry Ford's 
decision in 1914 to double autoworker wages. Although Ford considered this to be a 
cost-saving strategy, due to such residual effects as lower employee turnover, better 
applicant pools, less frequent shirking, and improved productivity, Raff and Summers 
(1987) were unable to find complete support for this hypothesis. Regardless, this case
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illuminates the basic notion behind efficiency wage theory and its potential 
effectiveness as a compensation strategy.
It is prudent to note that the incentives for organizations to offer above-market 
wages are not weighted equally. For example, organizations that confer a high degree 
of discretion and autonomy upon their employees are more likely to benefit from paying 
at the efficiency wage level. This is because, in these instances, organizational 
performance is intimately correlated with worker efforts and abilities. Other examples 
include organizations that rely on a highly skilled or technically advanced workforce or 
where the sheer size of the organization or geographic dispersion of its employees 
makes monitoring or controlling behavior difficult (Frank & Cook, 1995; Krueger & 
Summers, 1988; Milkovich & Newman, 1999).
Practical Advantages and Disadvantages Associated with Efficiency Wage Theory
Because efficiency wage theory sounds initially counterintuitive, it may raise 
political eyebrows. The idea of paying public employees more to reduce costs while 
also providing more services is a hard pill for some elected officials to swallow. Thus, 
an initial disadvantage of the theory involves the difficulty of convincing elected 
officials that higher wages can reduce overall costs in the long run. It is generally 
surmised that the majority of elected officials and even most public managers feel more 
comfortable paying close to the "average" market wage. As long as a community pays 
near an average wage for its benchmark positions, it should generate sufficient applicant 
pools to replace normal employee turnover with adequately competent workers.
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Yet a potential advantage of efficiency wage is that it may enable an 
organization to substantially reduce the paperwork costs associated with employee 
monitoring. If employees are more motivated by higher than average market wages, 
they may perform better without as much close supervision or monitoring. Since the 
process of implementing a performance appraisal system can be very time consuming 
and the evidence surrounding whether these systems increase employee productivity is, 
at best, mixed, the prospect of eliminating this administrative burden could appeal to 
many public organizations.
A second practical disadvantage associated with an efficiency-wage-based 
compensation system involves the potential for wage compression. To borrow from 
Garrison Keillor, this can be referred to as the "Lake Wobegon effect” (1985). Lake 
Wobegon is that place in Minnesota where all of the men are strong, the women good 
looking, and children are above average (Keillor, 1985). As more managers strive to 
pay their employees above-average wages, pressure is placed on the remaining 
organizations to increase their own wages in order to effectively compete. This 
ratcheting effect will make it increasingly difficult for premium-paying organizations to 
remain higher paying relative to their competitors. Thus, as the relatively lower paying 
organizations increase their base pay levels, this will eventually narrow the gap between 
the highest and lowest paying organizations. This desire to be "above average" could
becom e very costly for all organizations within the same comparable market system.
Another potential disadvantage is the "free rider" effect (Olson, 1965). This 
refers to employees who receive an efficiency wage from their organization and, in turn, 
do not provide the level of output that such a system expects. In other words, some
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8
employees may not feel compelled to work harder even though they are paid above 
average; their higher performing colleagues essentially carry them. Given that one of 
the primary cost-saving functions cited for an efficiency wage is the reduction of formal 
employee monitoring, free riders may become more difficult to identify. Hence, they 
represent a hidden cost to the system.
Supporters of efficiency wage theory, however, are inclined to argue that free 
riders and shirkers have the disadvantage of being disdained by their peers. In systems 
that pay well, higher performing workers may be less willing to carry shirkers and more 
inclined to put pressure on them to increase performance. Because employees generally 
are familiar with those in their immediate work groups, the high performers may be 
unwilling to risk the potential negative impact that poor individual performance may 
have on overall group productivity. In this way, the efficiency wage, as opposed to pay 
systems that rely on more formalized control mechanisms, may be a more effective way 
of controlling free riding through informal group peer pressure.
The practical advantage for public managers stemming from this type of pattern 
is clear. Public managers can eliminate some of the cumbersome formal control 
apparatus that they normally need to compel employees to behave and perform 
properly. Since many managers exhibit voluminous rating errors in the application of 
control mechanisms, such as performance appraisals (Latham & Wexley, 1981), the 
elimination o f  such systems should be lauded by public managers - especially if more 
effective alternative control mechanisms, requiring substantially less system 
development, can replace them.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9
In summary, the practical advantages associated with an efficiency-wage-based 
compensation system may include:
1. The elimination of the need for formal employee monitoring systems.
2. Better control of free riders or shirkers through informal group peer pressure.
3. A reduction in overall system costs due to higher employee performance by fewer 
employees, coupled with lower training needs and less need for quality control.
Some disadvantages associated with this type of system may include:
1. The difficulty of convincing municipal elected officials that paying employees 
higher than current market rates will reduce costs.
2. The Lake Wobegon effect (Keillor, 1985). As more communities strive to become 
above average, this will compress the distance between higher and lower paying 
organizations. This could result in higher overall compensation costs for 
organizations within the same market yet have a reduced positive effect on 
employee behavior and performance.
3. The potential for some employees to take advantage of higher pay scales without 
commensurate increases in their performance. Some employees may become free 
riders or shirkers and, because the higher paying municipalities may utilize fewer 
formal accountability controls, it may be harder to identify these poor performers.
In short, the goal of this research is to answer the question of whether employee 
wages are positively correlated with performance and productivity. The answer to this 
question has important ramifications for a number of deeply held beliefs regarding 
public-sector compensation, such as starting pay and performance-based incentives. 
Moreover, an efficiency wage strategy compels employers to rethink practices related to
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employee recruitment, retention, and evaluation. Pointing out room for improvement 
in these areas will better help public sector managers recruit and maintain a more 
motivated and productive workforce, ultimately leading to a more effective, cost- 
efficient organization.
The Research Context
Existing research on efficiency wage theory has focused, almost exclusively, on 
the private sector. This study, however, represents a clear divergence away from 
traditional scholarship, as the public sector served as the unit of analysis. Practically 
speaking, there are a number of reasons why public-sector approaches to efficiency 
wage theory are substantially different from the private sector. These differences, in 
essence, highlight why it is difficult to accurate cross-sector comparisons.
First, research by Perry (1996, 1997, 2000), Perry and Wise (1990), and Rainey 
(1982, 2003) suggests that many individuals are attracted to the public sectors out of a 
sense of service; conversely, those entering the private sector are often drawn by 
monetary rewards. Second, organizations in the public and private sector operate under 
very different external markets. For all intents and purposes, the public sector is not- 
for-profit, whereas the private sector is for-profit. This leads to substantially different 
measures of organizational success, where profit serves as the primary measure in the 
private sector and the public sector relies on the quality o f  services provided. In a 
similar vein, public-sector organizations typically offer a larger range of products and 
services than organizations in the private sector. Not all of these products and services 
are intrinsically profitable; thus, service quality emerges as the primary yardstick by
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which to assess organizational success. Third, there is an inability to develop a 
plausible methodology with which to make accurate cross-sector comparisons. Many 
private-sector organizations operate under competing markets, as they have offices or 
employees located in several locations throughout the country. Selecting organizations 
in the private sector to compare to those in the public sector while maintaining clear 
linkages to other variables would, at best, be arbitrary.
This research attempted to avoid such hurdles by utilizing a sample of public 
organizations located within a single labor market. Specifically, the type of public 
organization serving as the unit of analysis was municipal government, and the labor 
market was defined as competing municipalities within the Chicagoland region. A 
municipality’s status as a recognized member of the International City/County 
Management Association served as the primary impetus determining whether it was 
included in this study (International City/County Management Association [ICMA], 
2006). This resulted in an initial population of 166 municipalities, of which results 
were collected for 79, or ~ 48%, of those surveyed.
Study Components
This study consisted of three major components: (1) the dissemination of 
written survey instruments, (2) an illustrative case study relying on interviews, and (3) 
the collection o f  sociodemographic environmental data.
Two separate written survey instruments were distributed to all ICMA- 
recognized municipalities within the greater Chicagoland region: a salary and fringe 
benefits questionnaire and reputational service quality questionnaire. The salary and
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benefits questionnaire was distributed to the individual responsible for the 
municipality’s personnel or human resources function. Respondents were asked to 
complete a fairly lengthy survey designed to collect salary data on a wide variety of 
benchmark jobs. For a complete list of the jobs surveyed, see Appendix A. Additional 
questions pertaining to fringe benefits were also included.
Noting the significance of wages to this study, the market wage ratio of each 
municipality serves as the independent variable of primary importance. This ratio was 
calculated by taking the average benchmark pay and dividing by the regional wage 
benchmark. The regional wage benchmark is a summation of the average benchmark 
pay across all municipalities within a given labor market. Put another way, the greater 
Chicagoland region comprises a single labor market; all of the municipalities falling 
within that area are used to calculate the regional wage benchmark. The variables used 
for this study are explained in greater detail in Chapter III on research methodology.
Each municipality that received a compensation survey was also sent a 
reputational service quality questionnaire to complete. In this survey, the respondent, 
or professional administrator, was asked to identify municipalities within his or her 
service region known for providing highly innovative, high-quality services. It was 
reasoned that professional administrators know each other quite well through their 
professional networks, making them relatively cognizant of how well each other’s 
municipality is doing. The respondent could identify as many or as few communities as 
he or she wished for a variety of core service areas. For a listing of the core municipal 
service areas surveyed, see Appendix B. In addition, respondents were requested to 
note any communities known for exceptionally high-quality services overall. The logic
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behind the reputational service quality questionnaire was to ascertain whether highly 
reputable communities would arise from the mix by receiving multiple hits from 
different professional administrators.
While surveys can be done fairly quickly and without transportation or formal 
appointments, their use suffers from an inability to capture the more subtle intervening 
variables that influence a municipality’s compensation philosophy. For instance, the 
culture, tradition, innovative spirit, leadership, and political environment found in a 
municipality are likely important determinants of pay. As a way to begin addressing 
these variables, a municipality was identified to serve as a case study through a series 
of in-depth interviews. The case study will be discussed in the final chapter of this 
dissertation and is intended primarily to illustrate how an efficiency wage compensation 
strategy comes together successfully in a public-sector organization.
The third major component of this study was the collection and analysis of 
sociodemographic environmental data on each municipality and its respective 
population. Such collection was important insomuch as a municipality’s size, affluence, 
and demographics may explain more of why a city is perceived as having high-quality 
services than does its compensation strategy. Accordingly, any valid study on 
compensation must take into account the confounding effects of municipal size, 
affluence, number of employees, and size of budget. For a list of the sociodemographic 
variables collected, see Table 1.
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1. Municipal size (population)
2. Municipal geographic location
3. Municipal per capita income
4. Municipal workforce (total number of full-time employees)
5. Municipal general fund expenditure
Methodological Advantages and Hurdles
There are some important advantages to this type of design. First, limiting this 
study to one region allowed sample cities to share a common culture. In addition, 
municipalities in the same region directly compete with each other for potential pools 
of job applicants and, therefore, are in competitive markets that should be roughly 
comparable. While it is readily acknowledged that limiting this study to a single, 
highly defined region constrains the generalizability of the findings, it is believed that 
the benefits derived from a highly specific, single-region analysis outweighs this 
limitation. Regardless, under this condition the findings are prevented from being 
generalized on a national level with statistical certainty. This concern, however, was 
offset by the belief that municipal government and the people who make it work are 
similar across the country. As such, each is concerned with employee compensation 
and the impact that wage levels may have upon a municipality’s performance. Thus,
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findings should not be viewed as only applicable to the Chicagoland region but also 
to the population of municipalities.
A second advantage involved the utilization of a research methodology based on 
both quantitative and qualitative techniques. Simply put, combining surveys with elite 
interviews allowed for a more in-depth analysis through the eyes of multiple 
individuals. The case study approach added further depth and helped tether the theory 
of efficiency wage to practical administrative issues. A third advantage speaks to the 
researcher’s knowledge of the general area as well as the specific cities involved, 
providing for a deeper sense of understanding and insight than would likely have been 
present in a national study.
Operationalizing efficiency wage theory poses many methodological hurdles for 
a researcher to overcome. First, it was necessary to identify a sufficient number of 
similar public organizations in order to generate an N size large enough for statistical 
analysis. To address this initial challenge it was decided that municipal government 
offered the best solution. Municipalities typically provide a similar set of core services 
and programs when compared to municipalities in different states. Also, forms of 
municipal government have become standardized (Frederickson, Johnson, & Wood, 
2004) to a point where many cities have adopted similar types of professional 
administrative structures.
A second hurdle involved penetrating a public organization's pay system with 
enough depth to collect data on a wide variety of benchmark job descriptions. This 
necessitated that a considerable amount of time be spent recording data points where the 
data is highly sensitive and difficult to collect without violating privacy or
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confidentiality norms. For example, each sampled municipality was requested to 
complete a lengthy survey instrument involving highly detailed salary data for several 
benchmark positions.
A third methodological hurdle involved the dependent variables. The question 
arose, “In what ways can one measure an outcome of wage systems that would be 
comparable across a wide spectrum of municipalities?”
One solution was to measure the turnover or quit rates for the surveyed 
communities. Turnover rate should be indicative of how much employees like their 
jobs in respective communities. Presumably, municipalities that have higher wages 
should have correspondingly lower turnover rates. Another solution involved the 
complexity of employee accountability mechanisms. Communities that utilize a high- 
wage strategy should rely less on formal accountability mechanisms, such as merit pay, 
performance appraisals, or skill-based pay mechanisms, due to a decreased risk of 
shirking. Measuring a municipality’s wage cost per employee was identified as another 
solution. As previously noted, the idea of paying public employees more to reduce 
costs while also providing more services sounds initially counterintuitive. Nevertheless, 
all other things being equal, a higher wage community should experience wage costs 
that are no greater than a lower wage community.
A final solution involved identifying overall organizational performance, service 
quality, and productivity. Unlike a m unicipality’s turnover or quit rate, number of 
accountability controls utilized, or per employee wage costs, capturing an 
organization’s performance level or service quality is a much more ambiguous process. 
Compounding the problem is the fact that there is no one hard measure or database that
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a researcher can turn to in order to garner this information. Although a 
municipality’s turnover rate, control mechanisms, and costs per employee are partially 
indicative of performance, such variables are a far from perfect measure. There are 
numerous reasons why an employee may decide to terminate his or her employment 
with a community or why a municipality may utilize control mechanisms or have 
extraordinarily high wage costs beyond poor performance and productivity. Given this 
dilemma, the development of a reputational service quality index, created via subject- 
matter experts, emerged as the best way to capture the effect, if  any, that pay has upon 
service quality.
A Model for Understanding Improved Organizational 
Outcomes Associated with Efficiency Wage Rates
This study examines the impact, if any, that paying higher wages has upon 
desirable outcomes associated with efficiency wage theory. Thus, the model for 
understanding improved organizational outcomes depicts the potential impact that an 
efficiency wage rate has upon municipal performance and productivity. The model is 
graphically displayed in Figure 1. In this model, a municipality’s decision whether to 
pay an efficiency wage rate is an integral determinant of perceived reputational service 
quality, employee turnover or quit rate, reductions in accountability control 
mechanisms, initial employee selection, and per employee wage costs. It is not 
surprising that a municipality’s sociodemographic as well as cultural aspects impact the 
likelihood that an above-market wage will be offered.

























lower turnover rate 
fewer number of 
employee accountability 
control mechanisms 
better employee selection 
lower per employee 
wage costs
Figure 1. A model for understanding improved organizational 
outcomes associated with efficiency wage rates.
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Presumably, efficiency wage alone does not account for all o f  the 
aforementioned variations in municipal performance and productivity. Therefore, the 
model controls for the effects of both sociodemographic control variables and 
intervening variables. For example, the size and affluence of a municipality as well as 
its culture, tradition, innovative spirit, professional leadership, and political 
environment are all contributing factors that must be taken into consideration.
However, due to limitations associated with data, time, and resources, intervening 
variables are not examined in this study. While the case study presented in Chapter V 
may provide some context and insight regarding the effects of these variables, future 
research should undoubtedly be focused on this area.
For the purpose of clarity, and in line with other efficiency wage studies, 
municipal compensation will be addressed from a strictly wage perspective. In other 
words, the analysis will not be confounded by any "total compensation" models, which 
combine salary with fringe benefits. Accurately converting or placing a dollar value on 
fringe benefits, such as health care or paid vacation, is, at best, a nearly impossible 
undertaking. For example, making an across-the-board comparison of the out-of-pocket 
health-care costs that a municipality pays per employee would not accurately capture 
the true value of that fringe benefit. Conceivably, an employee working in a 
municipality where the health-care benefit being provided is $1,000 higher than the 
regional average receives an additional $ 1,000 worth o f  health care per year. However, 
the fact that a municipality pays more or less for its employees’ health care says nothing 
about the range or quality of the health-care benefits being provided. The issue of 
fringe benefits is taken up in greater detail in Chapter III on research methodology.
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The research model leads to a number of testable hypotheses. For the purpose 
of introducing the reader to things to come, the hypotheses are grouped into four major 
categories. Each category represents a primary tenet of efficiency wage theory that, 
when taken together, comprise the basis for the overall model. Readers should note that 
no hypotheses are put forth regarding employee selection, as this aspect of efficiency 
wage theory is not directly being tested in this study.
The hypotheses regarding municipal service quality, employee turnover, 
accountability control mechanisms, and total organizational wage costs and wage costs 
per employee should be transparent. It is posited that municipalities offering higher 
wage rates will also be identified as having higher levels of perceived reputational 
service quality, lower turnover or quit rates, fewer accountability control mechanisms, 
and lower wage costs per employee. Of course, these central ideas must carefully 
consider alternative hypotheses. For example, factors such as municipal size, affluence, 
and demographics likely contribute to a municipality’s perceived level of performance 
and productivity, turnover rate, accountability control mechanisms, and wage costs. 
Consequently, the confounding effects of municipal size, affluence, and budget must be 
considered, as it could be the case that wealthier, larger municipalities have the 
advantage of larger base budgets enabling them to more easily leverage higher wage 
systems.
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Perceived Reputational Service Quality Hypothesis:
1. Higher perceived reputational service quality is associated with higher wages when 
controlling for municipal size, workforce, per capita income, and general fund 
expenditure.
Turnover Hypothesis:
2. Lower turnover or quit rate is associated with higher wages when controlling for 
municipal size, workforce, and overall wage costs.
Accountability Control Hypothesis:
3. Fewer accountability control mechanisms are associated with higher wages when 
controlling for municipal workforce, overall wage costs, and reputational service 
quality.
Wage Costs per Employee Hypothesis:
4. Lower wage costs per employee are associated with higher wages when controlling 
for municipal size and per capita income.
Organization for This Dissertation
This dissertation is comprised of five chapters, each of which will cover a topic 
relevant to providing the reader with a holistic view of the subject. Chapter I has 
introduced the basic case for utilizing higher wages as a strategy in the public sector to 
produce desirable organizational outcomes related to efficiency wage theory. A  brief 
overview of efficiency wage theory has been provided in addition to a discussion of the 
practical advantages and disadvantages associated with this theory. In order to ground 
the efficiency wage theory in a broader context, a brief overview of public-sector
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compensation has also been included. Finally, a model depicting the major 
assumptions being tested by this study is presented along with the major hypotheses that 
drive this research.
Chapter II has two primary functions. First, in order to better link wages to 
increased organizational outcomes, the important role that equity considerations and, 
through this, the labor market play is examined. Second, a review of the most pertinent 
literature concerning efficiency wage theory is explored. As previously mentioned, the 
overwhelming majority of this research is concentrated on the private sector; thus, the 
limited applicability of this research is discussed. In addition to providing an in-depth 
background on research already undertaken on the subject, a summation of the most 
pertinent theoretical efficiency wage models and empirical findings is presented.
Chapter III discusses the research methodology used to complete this study in 
much greater detail than in the first chapter. This discussion includes a detailed 
introduction to the surveys utilized and data gathered; special attention is given to 
identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the methodology. In addition, an 
explanation of the statistical as well as qualitative techniques employed in this study is 
provided.
Chapter IV presents the findings of quantitative analysis. Readers are also 
provided with an overview of certain key demographics related to the sample. In
addition, emerging patterns in the survey data are addressed by pointing out illustrative
examples. These examples have been culled from specific questions in the salary and 
fringe benefits survey that, while not appropriate for statistical analysis, help to better 
illustrate some key concepts.
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Chapter V makes recommendations regarding the utilization of efficiency 
wage theory as a method for strategic compensation in the public sector. When drawing 
conclusions, the results of the statistical analysis, as well as the case study, are relied 
upon. Ways in which municipal government professionals might utilize this study’s 
findings to guide their own compensation policies are considered. Most of these 
revolve around linking wages to improved organizational outcomes. Finally, this 
chapter provides a basis for future research and, hopefully, some ideas for others to 
follow up on what has already been completed.
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CHAPTER II 
EFFICIENCY WAGE THEORY:
LINKING WAGES TO IMPROVED ORGANZATIONAL OUTCOMES
Efficiency wage theory centers on the basic notion that organizations experience 
a variety of benefits, including increased productivity, higher morale, lower turnover, 
and decreased shirking, as a result of paying their employees higher than average or 
market-clearing wages. While this theory has only recently been formalized, primarily 
within the field of economics, the foundations of a wage-productivity link can be traced 
back as far as 1734 (Weiss, 1990). As previously noted, a review of the literature over 
the past two decades does not provide much, if anything, in the way of meaningful 
research on efficiency wage theory in the public sector (Gabris & Davis, 2006). Given 
this void, it is necessary to undertake a cautious review of the efficiency wage literature, 
primarily centered in the private sector, in order to analyze how this compensation 
strategy may benefit public-sector organizations. However, prior to addressing specific 
research associated with efficiency wage theory, the important role that equity 
considerations play within the external market should be examined first.
Equity Considerations
Equity considerations are a major concept on which modern compensation 
systems should be built (Belcher, 1974). At a basic level, equity invokes the concept of
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fairness. For example, it is not uncommon for an employee to question whether he or 
she is being paid fairly in relation to: (1) the broader external market, (2) others doing 
the same kind of work within the organization, or (3) the individual level of 
performance being put forth. Perceptions of unfairness regarding pay will likely lead to 
negative consequences for the organization; conversely, both real and perceived fairness 
in pay should more fully motivate employees to support the goals of the organization.
Wallace and Fay (1988) contend that compensation systems should take three 
primary types of equity into consideration: internal, individual, and external. Internal 
equity involves the amount or value that an organization places on a position relative to 
other positions within the organization. The most common method for determining 
internal equity is through the application of some type of job evaluation instrument 
(Siegel, 1998). Employees, however, can easily become upset with internal equity 
imbalances if they perceive that their position is being undervalued or underappreciated. 
Such perceptions can lead to decreased satisfaction with pay (Goodman, 1974; Klein, 
1973; Scholl, Cooper, & McKenna, 1987; Weiner, 1980), higher turnover rates (Dittrich 
& Carrell, 1979; Telly, French, & Scott, 1971), and a reduction in job performance or 
productivity (Scholl, Cooper, & McKenna, 1987).
Another type of equity involves individual merit. Individual equity varies 
considerably from internal and external equity insomuch that less focus is placed on the 
job  relative to the merits o f  the individual filling that job (Wallace & Fay, 1988). It is 
of no surprise that some employees are more productive than their counterparts, thus 
justifying some form of pay differential. According to J. Stacy Adams’s (1965) 
perspective on "exchange theory,” employees compare their inputs (pay) and outputs
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(work) to one another. Perceived inequity occurs when an employee determines that his 
or her actual pay level is below what he/she ought to be paid. In order to balance this 
psychological equation, prudent organizations reward harder-working employees with 
more than those who do not work as hard.
There remains one more underlying equity reality: namely, that compensation 
systems must be linked to the external market. For the great majority of public 
organizations, all other forms of equity pay great deference to the external market. This 
is because the external market and, hence, external equity are the building blocks 
around which almost all compensation systems are constructed. A point of caution 
surrounding this type of thinking, however, is warranted. Scholl, Cooper, and 
McKenna (1987) contend that pay systems are often designed around the external 
market to the point of ignoring other types of equity altogether. In order to avoid 
problems associated with employee absenteeism, productivity and performance, and 
retention, all three equity constructs need to be taken into consideration (Wallace &
Fay, 1988). Regardless, in order to fully understand the theory and benefits connected 
with efficiency wage, one should think in terms of the "external market.”
The External Market
From the standpoint of economists, classic market theory can become quite 
abstract and multifaceted (see Becker, 1975; Carter, 1999; Dunlop, 1957; Hicks, 1934; 
Reynolds, 1946; Smith, 1776, for example). In reality, markets must be practically 
defined and readily measurable. For most public organizations, defining the external 
market provides the necessary boundaries from which external equity comparisons are
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made. It Is not uncommon for municipalities within a geographic region to develop a 
list of comparable communities based on criteria, such as size, affluence, number of 
employees, proximity, culture, service expectations, and tradition. The list of 
comparables is normally short (i.e., 10 to 20 municipalities), where the data is collected 
through various types of salary survey instruments. It is fundamental that public 
organizations, in order to remain competitive, develop a keen sense of the labor market 
in which they operate. While some positions within a municipality may involve a 
broader or even national market (i.e., city manager and a few specialized department 
heads), the great majority of municipal employees are recruited regionally. Thus, when 
one considers the idea of efficiency wage, it should be understood as a wage level 
higher than average within the regional market of municipal comparables.
For this study, the greater Chicagoland region served as the regional market 
area. Given the highly urbanized nature of this area, where it is commonplace for 
municipalities to share borders and for citizens to routinely live, work, and shop in 
multiple communities, it is an ideal location in which to study compensation philosophy 
through the lens of efficiency wage theory. Moreover, many of the municipalities in 
this region are roughly comparable in terms of size, affluence, number of employees, 
culture, service expectations, and tradition. They are also subject to the same state 
statutory authority, which adds to the strength, validity, and generalizability of the 
empirical findings.
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Proponents of efficiency wage theory contend that organizations benefit from 
paying their employees wage rates that are above market-clearing (i.e., at efficiency 
wage) levels. In general, the benefits derived from the payment of an efficiency wage 
occur in one of two ways: (1) by an incentive effect, whereby a job incumbent is 
compelled to produce more, or (2) by a sorting effect, whereby higher quality 
applicants are attracted to the organization initially (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003). The 
incentives for organizations to offer above-market-clearing wages, however, are not 
necessarily equal. For example, organizations that confer a high degree of discretion 
and autonomy upon their employees are more likely to benefit from paying an 
efficiency wage (Arai, 1994). This is because, in these instances, organizational 
performance is intimately correlated with worker efforts and abilities. Other examples 
include organizations that rely on a highly skilled or technically advanced workforce or 
where the sheer size of the organization or geographic dispersion of its employees 
makes monitoring or controlling behavior exceedingly difficult and likely cost 
prohibitive (Frank & Cook, 1995; Krueger & Summers, 1988; Milkovich & Newman, 
1999).
Efficiency wage theory is also related to implicit contract theory (Gordon, 1974; 
Rosen, 1985). The phrase “implicit contract” drives at the notion of “a fair day's pay 
for a fair day's work.” Under this incentive arrangement, higher pay results in a 
psychological expectation among employees that more is demanded from them. This, 
in turn, may reduce shirking and lead to less initial dissatisfaction with pay (Herzberg,
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1966). One problem with implicit contract theory is the assumption that performance 
can be measured and adjusted to balance with pay expectations (Heneman, 1992). By 
encouraging employees to perform to their maximum (Salop & Salop, 1976) they are 
less inclined to perform at their minimum, which, according to Nalbantian and Schotter 
(1997), many are otherwise inclined to do.
In the municipal realm, communities may be able to use higher wages in order 
to leverage more work from incumbent employees as well as a tool for increasing the 
size and quality of its applicant pools. Moreover, in most instances, larger 
municipalities will need to pay their professional administrator more than smaller 
municipalities. It is likely that an administrator working in a larger community has 
more responsibility and, therefore, requires greater skill in addressing complex issues 
where the risk of failure can lead to very serious consequences (Frank & Cook, 1995; 
Henderson & Frederickson, 1996). Under such circumstances, hiring the best available, 
even if it means paying more, would be cost effective. What follows is a discussion of 
the primary theoretical models that comprise the basic foundation upon which 
efficiency wage theory rests. Following this, pertinent results from studies dealing with 
varying aspects of these models are presented.
Efficiency Wage Models
To date, a number o f  theoretical m odels have been developed in order to test the 
broad assumptions associated with efficiency wage theory. These models include:
■ The Shirking Model
■ The Labor Turnover Model
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■ The Adverse Selection M odel
■ The Wage-Productivity Model
The shirking model posits that organizations can utilize above-market-clearing 
wages in dealing with problems associated with monitoring and measuring employee 
performance and productivity. Since organizations in both the public and private 
sectors have only imperfect or fragmented information concerning job performance, 
some workers are able to shirk their job duties without penalty (Yellen, 1984). For 
example, Lazear (1979) contends that the absence of an appropriate payment system 
provides employees an “incentive to cheat, shirk, and engage in malfeasant behavior”
(p. 1266). Some organizations may attempt to sidestep these problems by instituting a 
piece rate or commission-based compensation system; however, the costs associated 
with maintaining these systems are usually high (Katz, 1986). Moreover, Katz (1986) 
notes that when an employee is found to be shirking some aspect of his or her job, the 
punishments available to the organization are “typically limited by legal constraints and 
social customs” (p. 8).
The shirking model is closely connected to principal-agent theory. Similar to 
efficiency wage theory, principal-agent theory is grounded in the field of economics 
and is often used to link together the administrative and political elements of 
government (Wood & Waterman, 1994). Under this relationship, elected officials serve 
as “principals” who attempt to persuade the bureaucracy, or “agents,” to follow through 
with their policy preferences. While the principal-agent relationship is, in essence, 
governed by a contract specifying the responsibilities of each party involved, Perrow
(1986) noted that this relationship is fraught with problems, such as cheating or
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imperfect information. Therefore, similar to the shirking model, principals are faced 
with a limited range of options regarding how to deal with an agent who is choosing to 
shirk his or her responsibilities.
Under these circumstances, organizations attempt to seek out mechanisms to 
elicit adequate effort from their employees. Yellen (1984) proposes that one way to 
discourage shirking is to set wage levels above what a worker could readily obtain 
elsewhere. By increasing wages, employers essentially turn the tables on their 
employees, making the threat of termination an important antishirking mechanism 
(Katz, 1986). Similar to Yellen, Stoft’s (1982) “cheat-threat” theory contends that the 
threat of being fired creates a strong incentive not to shirk. Gerhart and Rynes (2003) 
point out that this view is consistent with the neoclassicists’ model regarding the choice 
between labor and leisure. Under this model, individuals are assumed to prefer leisure 
but work in order to support their need for various goods and services. Thus, from the 
neoclassicists’ viewpoint, the work itself does not elicit motivation; rather, the focus is 
on extrinsic rewards.
Employees choosing to shirk and who ultimately lose their jobs face a limited 
set of alternatives. For instance, an employee may: (1) attempt to find another high 
wage job, which is likely to be in very limited supply; (2) accept a lower paying job; or 
(3) enter unemployment (Yellen, 1984). Employees, thus, choose not to shirk due to 
the higher wage as w ell as the risks associated with losing that wage. Of course, 
employees weigh the consequences associated with job loss differently. Yellen (1984) 
cites the unemployment rate as a likely consideration, as higher unemployment implies
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that the pool o f  available replacement workers is greater. In this sense, “unemployment 
plays a socially valuable role in creating work incentives” (Yellen, 1984, p. 202).
Organizations may also offer wages in excess of market-clearing rates in order 
to reduce the costs associated with turnover. The premise of the labor turnover model 
is identical to the shirking model insomuch that high wages reduce turnover by making 
the high-paying job more attractive to current employees than alternative employment 
opportunities (Katz, 1986; Taylor, 2003; Yellen, 1984). Reducing turnover is most 
beneficial to organizations where the cost of replacing an employee is high -  to the 
point of exceeding the relative costs associated with paying above market-clearing 
wages. Put another way, the model predicts that high wages will be present where 
hiring or training costs are formidable. At the municipal level, jobs in law enforcement, 
fire protection, city planning, engineering, and information technology often require 
more extensive costs associated with hiring or training.
A theoretical objection to the labor turnover model commonly noted by 
economists (see Salop, 1979; Stiglitz, 1984, 1985, for example) centers on the need for 
organizations to distinguish, in terms of wages, between inexperienced and experienced 
workers. This is because the same wage is unable to clear the market or be above 
average for both new hires and trained workers (Salop, 1979). Yellen (1984) suggests 
that less experienced workers be paid a wage “equal to the difference between their 
marginal product and their training costs” (p. 203). In order to achieve this, a wage 
system based on seniority or some type of employment fee structure could be 
implemented. The risk of moral hazard, where an organization compels an employee to 
quit or otherwise leave an organization once the initial wage exceeds the market, is
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avoided, as it is in the best interest of the organization to maintain its trained workforce. 
Katz (1986), however, points out that many employees are risk averse; thus, it is 
unrealistic to assume that organizations can completely eliminate the costs associated 
with turnover.
According to the adverse selection model, organizations that subscribe to a high 
wage philosophy are more apt to attract a higher quality pool of job applicants, whereas 
low wage rates attract predominantly low-ability applicants. Among organizations 
where job performance is directly correlated with worker ability, knowing this is 
particularly advantageous. Although the model is not directly tested in this study, many 
residual aspects of adverse selection are present. For example, organizations with a 
strong, positively correlated wage-productivity link are likely to attract a higher quality 
pool of applicants initially. Moreover, less shirking, decreased turnover, or reduced 
absenteeism is likely, at least in part, due to the quality of the applicants being drawn to 
the organization. Optimally, an efficiency wage organization will be in a position to 
turn away individual applicants willing to work for less than the going wage. A 
willingness to work for less, according to Yellen (1984), places an “upper bound on his 
[or her] ability, raising the firm’s estimate that he [or she] is a lemon” (p. 203).
It should be cautioned that there is a high degree of complexity associated with 
the idea of linking pay to initial employee quality. Nonetheless, efficiency wage theory 
makes the assumption that there is a high probability such a linkage exists. From a 
research standpoint, there are numerous errors associated with measuring initial 
employee quality. For example, assessments of employee quality are susceptible to 
rater error, oftentimes rendering such measures spurious. Moreover, there are very few
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pre-existing measures of employee quality that one can easily tap into. Some 
professions, such as law enforcement, utilize large-scale pretest exams. Obtaining this 
data, however, is extremely complex and sensitive.
Since most organizations are able to collect only imperfect information 
regarding an applicant’s true ability, “random hiring” must be utilized (Katz, 1986, p. 
19). This cuts at the heart of the basic theoretical objection to adverse selection; 
namely, organizations will eventually discover an employee’s true ability regardless of 
the initial wage level offered. Put another way, an organization may offer a starting 
wage that exceeds the market-clearing rate and still end up hiring a low-ability 
employee. In this sense, organizations may be better off hiring at the mean and 
rewarding high performers via some type of performance-based wage system. 
Nonetheless, it is plausible to hypothesize that a higher starting wage increases the 
“expected ability” of an employee hired randomly from the applicant pool.
From a sociological standpoint, a high-paying organization may induce greater 
work effort by winning the loyalty and goodwill of its employees (Taylor, 2003). The 
wage-productivity model attempts to explain this behavior based on principles of 
appropriate social behavior. This model diverges from the aforementioned efficiency 
wage models insomuch that the neoclassical or individualistic maximization 
assumption is assumed away (Yellen, 1984). For example, Akerlof s (1982, 1984)
partial gift exchange theory asserts that worker effort is largely dependent upon group 
work norms. By encouraging employees to perform to their maximum they are less 
likely to perform at their minimum (Salop & Salop, 1976). Akerlof argues that high 
wages serve as one type of encouragement. Essentially, high wages are a “gift” that
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employees take in exchange for the “gift” of improved work norms and increased 
individual performance and productivity.
According to Akerlof (1984), the assertion that wages enhance job satisfaction 
and in turn increase employee performance brings up a basic empirical question: “All 
things being equal, do workers with greater pay produce greater output?” Akerlof 
offers Adams’s (1965) work on overreward inequity as empirical support for this 
question; however, he acknowledges, “Not all studies reproduce the result that 
‘overpaid’ workers will produce more” (p. 82). Thus, the wage-productivity model 
may help alleviate questions deemed counter to neoclassical thought, such as: Why do 
organizations not always fire less productive employees? Why are piece rates not used, 
even when their use would be quite feasible?
One objection to the wage-productivity link is that not all employees will view 
above-market-clearing wages as gifts or above average but as merely fair. In this sense, 
employees are less inclined to accept high wages in exchange for increased effort. In 
turn, this forces organizations to accept above-average wage costs without any of the 
added performance gains. Akerlof and Yellen (1990), in response to this criticism, 
propose the fair wage-effort hypothesis. Under this hypothesis, which is premised 
largely upon equity theory, workers perceive a “fair” wage and compare it to their 
“actual” wage. If the actual wage is conspicuously lower than what they perceive to be 
fair, a drop in performance is likely to occur. Depending on the “wage-effort elasticity” 
and the cost associated with shirking, turnover, or decreased performance, the fair wage 
may form a key part of the wage bargain (Akerlof & Yellen, 1990).
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According to Leonard (1987), there is a “long tradition” of differences in wages 
paid for the same occupations across organizations (p. 139). This is true even of those 
organizations drawing from the same general labor market. For example, Dunlop 
(1957) noted that in Boston in 1951 the industry with the highest pay for truck drivers 
paid 1.88 times as much as the lowest paying industry. In another example, Slichter 
(1950) observed that the hiring rates among 85 Cleveland-based firms ranged from $.50 
to $1.09 an hour in February 1947. Such variations are commonly referred to as an 
industry-wage differential.
One would assume that, over time, the market would fluctuate to such a degree 
that industries would take turns being the wage leader; however, industry-wage 
differentials appear to be highly stable and persistent. Wage differentials provide an 
empirical challenge to alternative labor market models insomuch as it makes 
accounting for differences in labor quality difficult. A standard competitive labor 
market model depicting industry-wage differentials requires differences in either labor 
quality or so-called “non-wage dimensions” (Katz, 1986, p. 25).
In the aforementioned example, Slichter found that the differential remained 
constant even though the Cleveland Chamber of Commerce had been compiling and 
distributing wage rates to area businesses for over twenty years. Other scholars, such 
as Cullen (1956), Reder (1962), Bell and Freeman (1985), and Krueger and Summers
(1987), have presented evidence of persistent industry-wage differentials, which,
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according to Leonard (1987), has created a “century of persistent and largely 
unexplained industry-wage effects” (p. 139).
A review of the industry-wage effect literature, however, reveals two 
regularities that are likely responsible for systematic differences in pay within 
occupations across organizations. First, higher wages are generally associated with 
higher profits. This “ability-to-pay” hypothesis is most notably supported by Dickens 
and Katz (1987) and Krueger and Summers (1987). In the context of the public sector, 
it would stand to reason that more affluent municipalities have larger tax bases, higher 
revenues and, hence, are in a better position to offer higher wages. Second, there is a 
strong relationship between wages and organizational size (see Brown & Medoff, 1985, 
for example). Larger municipalities, as determined by the number of full-time 
employees, are likely to generate more revenues and, thus, offer higher wages than their 
smaller counterparts. In addition, larger municipalities may need to increase wages in 
order to more vigorously compete with the private sector for personnel. Writing in 
support of the shirking model, Leonard (1987) noted, “Assuming that direct supervision 
is more difficult in larger [organizations], [size] can be taken as direct evidence in favor 
of the efficiency wage hypothesis” (p. 139).
What is much less obvious is why an organization would decide to share its 
extra revenues with its employees. Unobserved quality differences in workers, leading 
to both increased wages and profits, offer one explanation (Cain, 1976). The morale- 
productivity aspect of efficiency wage theory offers another. A basic implication of the 
theory is that, if  the conditions necessitating the payment of above-market wages vary 
across industries, then the optimal wage being offered within an industry will likely
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differ (Katz, 1986). This helps explain why employees with varying organizational 
affiliations but otherwise identical productive characteristics may be paid differently. 
Each model associated with efficiency wage theory attempts to identify organizational 
characteristics, such as high monitoring or training costs that best predict wage 
premiums.
To elaborate, the shirking model predicts that wages will be high where 
monitoring costs are large, allowing increased wages to serve as a surrogate to intensive 
monitoring activities. This, however, is in direct conflict with the theory of 
“compensating wage differentials.” This theory predicts that the relationship between 
autonomy and wages is negatively correlated insomuch that, in order to recruit an 
adequate labor supply to fill low-autonomy jobs, organizations must offer higher wages 
(Arai, 1994). The labor turnover model predicts that above-market-clearing wages will 
arise where recruitment and training costs are high. In instances where labor quality is 
not readily observable or measurable, higher wages, as implied by the model of adverse 
selection, will prevail. The wage-productivity model suggests that higher wages are 
most likely present where interpersonal relations, such as teamwork, are important 
(Katz, 1986). The primary point is that these models view wage differentials not only 
as a function of industry type but also with regards to the subtler differences present 
within the industry.
Despite the claims o f  efficiency wage theory, there is surprisingly little direct 
evidence that higher paying organizations reap benefits greater than otherwise similar 
organizations. Put another way, while the theoretical benefits associated with the use of 
an efficiency wage are well documented, empirically the evidence is relatively sparse.
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Regardless, a review of the available empirical evidence is warranted. Pertinent results 
from studies, overwhelmingly conducted within the confines of the private sector, are 
provided below.
The shirking model is predicated on the notion that above-market-clearing 
wages create incentives for better job performance, as substandard performance may 
lead to the loss of the higher wage. Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) have found support for 
the use of wages as a form of control. However, based on interviews with over 300 
U.S. business leaders, Bewley (1998) refuted this finding, stating, “Managers did not 
believe that higher pay brings greater work effort” (p. 486). In fact, almost universally, 
these managers stated that negative incentives and threats were actually harmful, as they 
“invited revenge” (Bewley, 1998, p. 486). Creating interest in one’s work, providing 
sufficient training, cultivating interpersonal relationships between management and 
employees, and recognizing employee achievements were the most common ways cited 
in which to elicit increased effort.
There is no question that monitoring individual performance is not always easy 
and it can be cost prohibitive. From a practical perspective, effort is more readily 
measurable in instances where employees are working on a piece rate or commission 
basis; however, even this type of measurement is fraught with error. For instance, 
Brown and Medoff (1989) estimated that the existence of piece rates in an organization 
would translate into fewer costs associated with em ployee monitoring, as effort is 
readily measured via output. However, contrary to their prediction, the authors found 
that piece-rate employees working in large organizations earned higher wages than 
those working for piece rates in smaller organizations (Brown & Medoff, 1989). The
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authors determined that organizational size, as opposed to the performance 
measurement system being utilized, was a better predictor of wages. Consistent with 
Brown and Medoff, Kruse (1992) found that a rise of one standard deviation in 
organizational size resulted in an approximately 6.8% increase in wages, after 
controlling for personal characteristics, occupation, and industry.
Calculating the supervisor-to-employee ratio is another possible measurement. 
According to Kruse (1992), the relationship between supervisor intensity and wages is 
defined by five theoretical predictions:
1. A negative relationship will exist when employees of equal ability, working in 
similar jobs, are being compared.
2. In general, managers choose to supervise high-ability or high-performing employees 
less closely. Given that individual ability is difficult to capture and, thus, rarely 
measured, much of the effect is lost in empirical studies.
3. Some employees hold occupations that, for whatever reason, pay more and require 
less supervision. Similar to individual ability, occupational differences are rarely 
captured.
4. In some instances, higher wages may be necessary to attract individuals into a 
particular profession.
5. Some organizations are acutely concerned with individual work quality and, thus, 
may systematically choose to pay an efficiency wage and closely supervise 
employees.
For example, Groshen and Krueger (1990) utilized data from 300 U.S. hospitals 
to determine whether those hospitals with a greater ratio of supervisors to employees
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tended to pay lower wages. Consistent with the shirking model, Groshen and Krueger 
found that increased supervision resulted in lower wages; however, they cautioned that 
their results might also be due to individual ability differences, as the only measure of 
labor quality was “occupation” (pp. 138-144). In another study, Leonard (1987) found 
little evidence in support of the shirking model when the ratio of supervisors to 
employees is the primary indicator of monitoring intensity. Similar to Groshen and 
Krueger, Leonard did not control for individual ability differences, which would likely 
influence his findings.
In a study examining full-time and part-time nonagricultural employees, Arai 
(1994) questioned whether the efficiency wage argument had any empirical validity in 
Sweden. Although the Swedish labor market operates under a central wage-based 
system, Arai pointed out that wage increases are determined by way of “firm-level 
negotiations” (p. 251). In this sense, organizations negotiate an optimal wage level 
based on a unique set of characteristics, which, in turn, creates the potential for a 
substantial wage differential. Arai hypothesized, in line with the shirking model, that 
increases in monitoring difficulty or monitoring cost will lead to increased wages being 
paid. Rather than focusing solely upon monitoring intensity, Arai reasoned that 
monitoring difficulty might more accurately portray an organization’s decision to pay 
an efficiency wage. Put another way, when an employee is more readily able to vary 
his or her effort, known as effort variation, the likelihood that an organization w ill offer 
an above-market wage increases. Effort variation is a measure of job autonomy; thus, 
higher levels of autonomy should be coupled with increased pay.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
42
Arai examined this relationship separately for public- and private-sector 
employees. In sum, the relationship between autonomy and pay was positive and 
significant for private-sector employees, whereas the relationship was negative and 
significant for public-sector employees. Specifically, private-sector employees whose 
jobs afford a high degree of autonomy, coupled with monitoring difficulty, were found 
to earn approximately eight percent more than nonautonomous, more easily monitored 
employees; nonautonomous employees in the public sector were found to earn roughly 
three percent more than their autonomous counterparts. Arai noted that it is unlikely 
that these findings were due to individual ability differences, as such a finding would 
not account for why the two sectors would be influenced differently.
Practically speaking, differences in the relationship between autonomy and 
wages in the private and public sectors may be explained by the difference between the 
organizations’ incentives to pay high wages. The role of wages is two-pronged in that 
they: (1) are offered at a high-enough level to attract potential employees to an 
organization initially and (2) may influence employee performance and productivity.
In the private sector, an organization’s output is expressed by the size of profit, whereas 
such evaluation is much more ambiguous or simply irrelevant in the public sector (Arai, 
1994). Moreover, public employees’ personal wealth is not influenced to any large 
extent by organizational output (i.e., stock options). Finally, public organizations are 
more restricted in the way that wages can be used to create work-effort-related 
incentives. It can therefore be argued that the private sector has greater flexibility in 
using wages to reward or punish an employee who shirks, compared to the public
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sector, and that any observed differences in autonomy and wages between these sectors 
are likely attributable, at least in part, to such factors.
In regards to the shirking model, a relative irony among public-sector 
organizations is that elected officials oftentimes place such a strong emphasis on 
employee accountability that the value associated with a reduction in supervision may 
not be viewed as beneficial. It is, however, fair to question: “What kind of 
accountability is most important?” For instance, if citizens perceive that their 
municipality is providing high-quality services overall, a strong case can be made for 
making individual employees less accountable to more formalized types of control. Put 
another way, if efficiency wage organizations are shown, as this research hypothesizes, 
to provide a higher level of service quality overall, then perhaps the often cumbersome, 
error prone, and sometimes cost-prohibitive measures of individual accountability can 
be dropped.
The labor turnover model, specific to efficiency wage theory, argues that 
offering above-market-clearing wages is actually a cost saving strategy. In this sense, 
the higher expense associated with the payment of above-average wages is less costly 
than the expense associated with the recruitment and training of new personnel. There 
is a relatively large body of literature exploring the effect of wages on turnover or quit 
rates. In essence, this literature puts forth the notion that voluntary turnover should 
decline when an organization offers wages that are higher than those being offered by 
its competitors. This relationship is supported both theoretically (Salop, 1973) and 
empirically (Parsons, 1977; Smith, 1977). Somewhat surprisingly, however, there is
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relatively little direct evidence that higher wage rates are, in fact, associated with lower 
turnover or quit rates.
In the aforementioned study, Leonard (1987) found a significant, yet small, 
effect of wages on turnover. Leonard examined the total number of separations among 
nonexempt employees in 200 high-technology organizations for a period of six months. 
The average six-month turnover rate for all organizations included in the sample was 
25%. After controlling for wages, total employment, occupational composition, 
industry, and area, the wage effect reduced turnover by approximately four percent. 
Thus, on the surface, it appears that the basic prediction of the labor turnover model is 
borne out: higher wages are correlated with lower turnover.
Leonard, however, questioned whether the association between wages and 
turnover is: (1) strong enough to adequately explain wage variation across 
organizations and (2) actually a cost saving strategy. In the first case, he noted that the 
variation between turnover and wages is considerable, with the former not being highly 
correlated enough with the latter to account for this variation. The second question was 
addressed by calculating the marginal cost of turnover and then comparing it to the 
added cost of wages. Leonard found that, on average, turnover costs would need to 
exceed roughly $58,000 per employee in order to be profitable. Given an average 
yearly per employee salary of $15,500, there is little reason to assume that turnover 
costs would approach anywhere near this estimate. Therefore, while Leonard was able 
to show that higher wages were associated with lower rates of turnover, the potential 
savings associated with this reduction did not exceed the costs associated with the 
payment of higher wages.
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Using data from 52 metalworking and engineering firms in the U.K. during the 
early 1980s, Wilson and Peel (1991) found no significant relationship between wages 
and turnover. Rather, according to Wilson and Peel, union representation and the 
presence of financial incentives, such as profit sharing or overtime pay, resulted in the 
most significant decreases in turnover. This finding has been supported theoretically by 
Florkowski (1987) and empirically by Rhodes and Steers (1981) and Hammer, Landau, 
and Stern (1988). However, Allen (1984) cautions, “[T]he effects of wages on absence 
rates cannot be unambiguously predicated. It will depend on whether the substitution 
effect of higher wages (lowering absences) dominates the income effect (raising 
absences)” (p. 34). For example, the availability of overtime pay (i.e., the substitution 
effect) has been shown to actually increase absenteeism and, thus, turnover (Martin, 
1971). However, in instances where pay and attendance have been overtly tied 
together, absenteeism decreased (Lawler, 1971).
Using data on 205 childcare establishments, employing 3,746 teaching staff, 
Powell, Montgomery, and Cosgrove (1994) examined the impact of wages and fringe 
benefits on turnover or quit rates. In order to control for differences in employee skill 
levels, Powell et al. differentiated between teachers and teacher aides. Moreover, the 
authors noted that few respondents were able to provide specific data related to their 
organization’s fringe benefits package; thus, respondents were asked to indicate 
whether one o f  17 predefined benefits, such as health and life insurance, paid vacation, 
sick leave, planning time, and pension benefits, were offered (Powell et al., 1994).
Using data from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Powell et al. estimated that 
offering all 17 fringes would comprise roughly 18% of the average childcare center’s
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total compensation bill. The authors found an association between wages and turnover; 
specifically, a one-dollar increase in wages amounted to an approximate three percent 
decrease in turnover among teachers and one percent decrease among teacher aides. 
Interestingly, other than the presence of a “significant” employee pension, fringe 
benefits were not shown to have any statistically significant impact on turnover among 
either skill group (Powell et al., 1994, p. 242).
Similar to Leonard (1987), Powell et al. (1994) questioned whether the amount 
saved through reductions in turnover outweighed the costs associated with higher 
wages. In this instance, the average cost per turnover would need to exceed more than 
$81,000 to be profitable. Their analysis, thus, coincided with Leonard’s findings 
insomuch as the effect of wages, when compared to turnover costs, is fairly small. Of 
course, it is possible to argue that higher wages do more than reduce turnover. Henry 
Ford (1926, p. 155) once stated, “[PJaying a high wage has the same effect as throwing 
a stone in a still pond.” Put another way, decreases in the turnover or quit rate is but 
one premise of efficiency wage theory. For instance, the effects of high wages are 
likely felt through other means, such as increased ease in filling vacancies, reduction in 
day-to-day absenteeism rates, and increased effort. Undoubtedly, the presence of any 
one of these effects would increase -  in some instances substantially -  the costs 
associated with turnover. Neither Leonard nor Powell et al. take these effects into 
consideration, thus, rendering their findings somewhat misleading.
In one of the few studies looking at the effectiveness of efficiency wage theory 
in the public sector, Kim (1999) examined turnover among the State of California’s 
Civil Service. Using data collected by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Kim
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analyzed wage and turnover data for approximately 40 of California’s 4,000 
occupations. While proportionately only a few occupations were examined, a fact that 
is also acknowledged by Kim, it should be pointed out that the occupations were 
selected based on their sensitivity to external market forces. Put another way, these 
occupations are commonplace in the broader labor market and, thus, are “most likely to 
be influenced by labor market competition” (Kim, 1999, p. 589). In general, Kim found 
that wages have little or no effect on the turnover or quit rate among the California Civil 
Service. In line with the aforementioned studies by Leonard (1987) and Powell et al. 
(1994), Kim noted that any reductions in turnover attributable to the payment of higher 
wages would not be substantial enough to offset the increased wage costs.
Interestingly, but not necessarily surprising, the unemployment rate emerged as 
the best predictor of turnover. Moreover, Kim found evidence that employees, while 
not necessarily concerned with their wage relative to other organizations, are concerned 
with their absolute wage and recent wage changes. In other words, an employee’s 
knowledge of whether their job is simply paid low, coupled with his or her level of 
satisfaction concerning recent wage increases, is more important than the wage being 
paid relative to what other organizations pay.
Kim’s finding is supported, at least theoretically, by Campbell (1994), who put 
forth a model depicting an employee’s decision to quit as most dependent upon the 
perceived level o f  satisfaction with his or her average wage increase. From this, it is not 
difficult to infer the potential implication of this model, as well as Kim’s finding, for 
efficiency wage theory. In general, organizations would no longer have an incentive to 
offer a higher wage initially; rather, the focus would be shifted toward employee
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retention via more pronounced wage increases. This, however, runs directly counter to 
the adverse selection model.
The model of adverse selection is premised on the notion that higher wages 
increase both the breadth and quality of an organization’s applicant pool. Kaufman 
(1984), utilizing interview data with managers from 26 organizations in the U.K. with a 
median employee size of seven, questioned whether “qualified personnel” could be 
found “at less than current wages” (pp. 101-102). The most common response 
indicated that competitive wages were necessary to attract qualified personnel; 
however, a few managers expressed a belief that above-market wages could be used to 
attract a more qualified applicant pool overall.
In another study, Krueger (1988) found that the application rate and applicant 
quality for public-sector jobs increased as the ratio of public-to-private-sector pay 
increased. Moreover, Holzer (1990) found that increased wages led to contracted 
vacancy rates, enhanced the perceived ease of hiring, and reduced the time devoted to 
informal training. This finding would seem to substantiate Lester Thurow's (1975) 
queue theory, stating that potential job applicants form a queue competing for positions 
as they become available. Finally, according to Ehrenberg and Smith (1988), higher 
pay may not only lead to better initial applicant pools but may also reduce turnover or 
quit rates compared to organizations paying less.
In general, much more empirical work is needed to uncover a sufficient amount 
of direct evidence associated with adverse selection. Moreover, as previously noted, the 
adverse selection model is not directly being tested in this research. This is primarily 
due to the substantial difficulty involved in the data collection process. In order to test
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this model directly, an organization would not only need to be willing to share its wage 
data, but would also need to provide information regarding the number of applicants as 
well as some measure of applicant quality. This is assuming, of course, that 
organizations compile this kind of statistical data in the first place.
The wage-productivity model is most commonly addressed from a sociological 
viewpoint; namely, by winning the loyalty and goodwill of its employees, high-paying 
organizations may experience measurable gains in performance and productivity. 
However, it should be noted that, similar to the adverse selection model, the empirical 
evidence surrounding the wage-productivity model is sparse. In order to better 
illuminate the basic tenets of this model, three studies are discussed below. The first 
study examines Henry Ford’s decision in 1914 to double autoworker wages and the 
impact this decision had on plant productivity levels. The second study looks at the 
morale levels for employees at the municipal water utility, a leading proponent of 
efficiency wages, in Denver, Colorado. The third study examines the relationship 
between team payroll and team performance in Major League Baseball from 1985 to 
2002. Although these studies are highly varied in topic, taken together they provide a 
basis for the wage-productivity model, as well as a foundation from which this research 
can build.
In 1914, Henry Ford decided to double the rate of pay for autoworkers to five 
dollars per day. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Ford considered this to be a cost 
saving strategy due to such residual effects as lower employee turnover, better applicant 
pools, less frequent shirking, and improved productivity. While Raff and Summers 
(1987) were unable to find direct support for this hypothesis, there is evidence -  albeit
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anecdotal -  that the increased wage rate positively impacted productivity. For example, 
Klann, a production foreman at that time, noted the company’s desire to increase 
productivity, stating, “[They] called us in and said that since the workers were getting 
twice the wages, [the management] wanted twice as much work. On the assembly lines, 
we just simply turned up the speed of the lines” (Klann, n.d., p. 84, quoted in Raff & 
Summers, 1987, p. 81). The data available from 1912-1918 indicate substantial 
productivity gains of approximately 55%; however, whether this strategy truly 
motivated employees to increase productivity or simply prodded them to perform at a 
quicker pace is not known (Raff & Summers, 1987).
Leavitt (1996) examined the morale levels of employees working for the 
municipal water utility in Denver, Colorado. The municipal water utility is a non-union 
organization with more than 1,000 employees. It directs its own civil service system, 
whose responsibilities include setting and maintaining wage rates. In terms of wages, 
the utility is known as a community leader, having positioned itself at approximately the 
75th percentile of market pay rates for several years. Testing a number of basic 
assumptions associated with efficiency wage theory, Leavitt found that the utility had 
very low turnover or quit rates as well as a large pool of job applications vying for 
positions. However, he also found a number of unexpected negative consequences 
concerning this pay strategy. For example, employees expressed a high degree of 
dissatisfaction when discussing their chances for advancement within the organization 
and believed that the number of qualified people deserving advancement far exceeded 
the number of opportunities available. Moreover, a significant percentage of the 
employees indicated they would seek outside employment when asked, “Would you
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accept a job at another company, doing the same job as you do here, with the same pay 
and benefits?” (pp. 335-336). Whether the employees in this organization were any 
more or less productive than their lesser paid counterparts was not specifically 
addressed. However, it stands to reason that dissatisfied employees are also less 
productive employees.
Wiseman and Chatterjee (2003) examined the relationship between team payroll 
and team performance in Major League Baseball (MLB) from 1985 to 2002. They 
noted that, from 1985 to 1990, there was very little variability in salary levels among 
MLB teams. However, from 1991 to 1997, a period during which two work stoppages 
(i.e., 1994 and 1995) occurred, substantially more variability in MLB team salaries 
began to emerge. Since 1997, this variability has increased virtually unfettered, with 
the median MLB team salary rising every year except in 2002. The growing disparity 
between the highest paying teams and lowest paying teams has, in essence, created a 
wage system premised on efficiency wage theory.
Specifically, Wiseman and Chatterjee undertook a test of the wage-productivity 
model by examining whether there is a relationship between team performance and 
average team salary. Generally speaking, they found a strong relationship between on- 
the-field team performance and team salary. From 1998 to 2002, the average difference 
in the number of games won between teams whose salary was among the top 25% and 
teams with salaries in the bottom 25% was 14.7 games. This differential was 10.7 
games in the period from 1991 to 1997 and just 5.5 games from 1985 to 1990. 
Consistent with the wage-productivity model, higher paying teams experienced a higher 
level of performance and productivity, defined in terms of the average number of games
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won. It should be noted that Wiseman and Chatterjee did not examine whether 
productivity increased on a player-by-player basis. This, however, should not offset 
their basic finding that productivity, at least collectively, was improved among teams 
with the highest average salaries.
Conclusion
The preceding discussion was aimed at giving the reader a deeper understanding 
of the broad assumptions, theoretical models, and empirical data associated with 
efficiency wage theory. Although steeped in theoretical rigor, the shirking model, labor 
turnover model, adverse selection model, and wage-productivity model are supported to 
a lesser degree empirically. Some of the trends associated with the empirical findings 
are summarized as follows:
■ There is a long history of differences in wages paid, known as industry-wage 
differentials, for the same or similar occupations across organizations.
■ Generally speaking, higher wages are strongly correlated with higher profits and 
organizational size.
■ The use of wages in order to control employee behavior or curtail shirking is 
empirically supported. Consistent with the shirking model, increased supervision 
and decreased autonomy are associated with lower paying jobs.
■ The correlation between higher wages and lower turnover or quit rates is mixed. 
While there appears to be some evidence that higher wages reduce turnover, most 
studies indicate that the average savings earned via reductions in turnover do not 
exceed the increased cost of wages. These studies, however, fail to take into
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account a number of potentially cost-saving mechanisms associated with reduced 
turnover, such as an increased ease in filling vacancies, reduction in day-to-day 
absenteeism rates, and increased effort.
■ There is limited evidence that higher wages lead to larger, more qualified applicant 
pools.
■ Higher wages are positively correlated with improved levels of performance and 
productivity. However, similar to the adverse selection model, much more 
empirical analysis is needed in order to fully explore this relationship.
In Chapter III, the methodology used in completing this study is discussed in 
much greater detail than in the first chapter. This discussion includes a detailed 
introduction to the surveys utilized and data gathered; special attention is given to 
identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the methodology. In addition, an 
explanation of the statistical as well as the qualitative techniques employed in this study 
is provided.
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CHAPTER III
DEVELOPING THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Study Design and Method of Research
To date, different methodologies have been utilized in studies dealing directly 
with efficiency wage theory. The studies detailed in the preceding chapter demonstrate 
the potential success or failure of this compensation strategy; however, these studies, 
with the exception of Kim (1999) and Leavitt (1996), examined only private-sector 
organizations. It should also be noted that the vast majority of these studies utilized 
either surveys exclusively or mixtures of surveys and elite interviews. Kaufman (1984) 
and Leavitt (1996), however, successfully used a strictly qualitative methodology to test 
efficiency wage hypotheses. In essence, the design and method for this research was 
laid out in order to improve upon the methodologies used by previous studies.
Moreover, by focusing exclusively on the public sector, this research creates a 
foundation upon which future studies may build.
Obtaining an accurate portrait of municipal compensation across a large 
metropolitan area is a difficult and complex task. To this end, this study relied upon the 
collection of original survey data as well as an illustrative case study employing a 
qualitative methodology. Generally speaking, the surveys provided a broad array of 
quantifiable data pertaining to a municipality’s pay strategy, current wage levels, and
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perceived level of performance. The case study was undertaken in an effort to garner 
information on the political environment, atmosphere, and other less tangible variables 
necessary for the successful implementation of an efficiency wage strategy. A small 
selection of elite interviews was conducted for the case study. While the interviews 
serve as an important source of data, they most notably provide context to the more 
abstract qualities of efficiency wage theory.
By approaching the study of efficiency wage theory from multiple angles, it is 
hoped that a high degree of validity pertaining to the theory’s effectiveness in the public 
sector will be achieved. What follows is a discussion of the research design, 
justification for choosing the design, and a synopsis of the process of carrying out the 
design. The specific research variables utilized are included, followed by a brief 
description of how these variables were measured. In addition, the research hypotheses 
outlined in Chapter I are restated and, when applicable, linked to existing efficiency 
wage literature.
Selection of the Sample
This research utilizes a sample of municipalities from the Chicago metropolitan 
area. This area is defined as the Chicago suburban metropolitan area (SMA), stretching 
from the Indiana border on the south to the Wisconsin border on the north to the 
DeKalb County border on the west. Confining this study to a single region makes 
sense from the standpoint that all of the municipalities located in this area are 
potentially part of the same labor market. It is conceivable that individuals can travel 
between these communities with relative ease, thus creating region-wide employment
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opportunities. A municipality’s status as a recognized member of the International 
City/County Management Association (ICMA) served as the primary impetus for 
determining whether it was included in this study (ICMA, 2006). Such recognition 
ensured that the municipality employed a professional administrator, typically under the 
council-manager or council-administrator form of government. This resulted in an 
initial population of 166 municipalities, from which results were collected for 79, or 
~ 48%, of those surveyed. For a numerical breakdown of the municipalities by county, 
see Table 2.
Table 2
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In general, municipalities are dispersed throughout the Chicago SMA; however, 
the largest concentrations are found in the western and northwestern suburbs. 
Responding municipalities, organized by county, are depicted graphically in Figure 2 
and listed alphabetically in Appendix C.
Survey Questionnaires
Survey questionnaires formed the primary component of the data collection 
process. Two separate written survey instruments were distributed to all ICMA- 
recognized municipalities in the Chicago SMA: a salary and fringe benefits survey and 
reputational service quality questionnaire. Much of the data was collected from an 
earlier project conducted by the author, in conjunction with Dr. Gerald T. Gabris, that 
examined the broad impact of wages on municipalities located throughout Illinois, 
Missouri, and Wisconsin. For this study, however, a concerted effort was made to 
increase the sample size, which included two additional mailings and follow-up 
telephone calls to the intended respondent. In all, responses were collected from 79, 
or ~ 48%, of the 166 ICMA-recognized municipalities in the Chicago SMA. For both 
studies, data was collected during fall 2005 and spring 2006. The salary figures 
reported are for FY 2006.
As a rule, individual responses were kept confidential. The municipality that the 
response came from was identified on the returned surveys. Information was used both 
in the aggregate and as it pertained to individual municipalities. Also, responding 
municipalities were provided with a summary of the results. The results provided only 
aggregate data and did not identify individual communities.






Figure 2. Chicago SMA responding municipalities.
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Respondents were asked to complete a fairly lengthy survey designed to collect 
salary data on a wide variety of benchmark jobs. Additional questions pertaining to 
fringe benefits were also included. The salary and fringe benefits survey was 
distributed to the individual responsible for the municipality’s personnel or human 
resources function. In some instances, this individual was the human resources 
manager. In other instances, the assistant city administrator or city administrator carried 
out the human resources function. Municipal size or population and the number of full­
time employees appear to be the primary factors in determining whether the 
municipality has a dedicated human resources manager. Therefore, as a rule, the salary 
and fringe benefits survey was directed to the individual responsible for overseeing the 
municipality’s human resources function. For a copy of the salary and fringe benefits 
survey, see Appendix D.
For the purpose of clarity, and in line with existing efficiency wage studies, 
compensation is addressed from a strictly wage perspective. In other words, the 
analysis has not been confounded by any "total compensation" models, which combine 
salary with fringe benefits. As noted in Chapter I, accurately converting or placing a 
dollar value on fringe benefits, such as health care or paid vacation, is an extremely 
difficult undertaking. For example, making an across-the-board comparison of the out- 
of-pocket health-care costs that a municipality pays per employee would not accurately 
capture the true value of that fringe benefit. It could be that the higher paying
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municipality has only a few employees and, therefore, must likely pay more for health 
care than a very large community.
In addition, one might surmise that the value of a municipality’s pension plan 
would be included in a study addressing compensation. While it is true that the value 
added by a pension plan contributes to an employee’s overall compensation package, in 
reality there is very little difference in the value added, as most municipalities 
participate in the same system: the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund. It is, thus, 
conceivable that employees are content knowing that a pension plan is available and are 
willing to forgo knowing the actual dollar value added.
This brings up another fundamental point regarding fringe benefits; namely, the 
dollar value added by a fringe benefit is oftentimes difficult for an organization to 
calculate and relay effectively. A cursory glance through current municipal job 
postings will typically provide the wage being offered and a summary of the benefits 
provided. Prospective employees, thus, are easily able to compare differences in wages 
for similar jobs between communities as well as make note of the type of fringe 
benefits offered, which are likely comparable.
A review of the benefits literature does not provide any guidelines or best 
practices for ascertaining the true value of a municipality’s fringe benefit package. 
Moreover, there are no recent databases or sources of fringe benefits that may be 
accessed. O f the data that does exist, the results are typically aggregated between  
public, private, and nonprofit organizations, or else they focus on private employers 
exclusively. For instance, the U.S. Department of Labor conducted national state and 
local government fringe benefit surveys in both 1994 and 1998; however, those surveys
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combined state and local em ployees together and failed to provide data on the 
percentage of municipal governments providing specific benefit types (Roberts, 2004). 
Other local government benefit surveys focused only on a single category of benefits, 
such as health care (Daley, 1993; Perry & Cayer, 1997; Strieb, 1995, 1996), while other 
studies employed metro area or “convenience samples” to assess a broader, aggregated 
array of benefits (Fredericksen & Soden, 1998).
The salary data collected serve two primary purposes. First, the data were used 
to calculate an overall average wage rate for each municipality. This calculation was 
completed by summing the average reported salary for each benchmark position 
surveyed divided by the total number of jobs reported. Where a municipality employed 
more than one individual in a given job, respondents were asked to report the average 
combined wage. Put another way, a municipality employing two or more patrol 
officers, all of whom earn varying wage rates, reported the average salary for all 
officers. This resulted in a single wage point that could then be used to determine the 
overall average municipal wage rate. This particular technique was utilized because 
municipalities commonly employ a similar standard, typically via salary surveys, when 
setting wage rates.
Having determined the average wage rate paid by each municipality in the 
sample, the salary data were used to calculate an average wage rate for the entire 
Chicago SMA. This calculation was completed by summing each municipality’s 
average wage rate divided by the total number of municipalities in the sample. This 
calculation resulted in a single wage point, which for this study is referred to as the 
regional wage benchmark. The regional wage benchmark is a summation of the
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average municipal wage rates paid within a given region. Put another way, the Chicago 
SMA comprises a single region; all of the municipalities falling within this region were 
used to calculate the regional wage benchmark.
In order to effectively compare wage levels across a large region, a ratio was 
calculated for each municipality. This ratio is referred to as the market wage ratio and 
serves as the independent variable of primary importance. The market wage ratio was 
calculated by dividing a municipality’s average wage rate by the regional wage 
benchmark. Municipalities paying above this benchmark and, hence, with a wage ratio 
greater than 1.00 pay an efficiency wage; those that pay below this benchmark or with a 
ratio less than 1.00 are not considered to be an efficiency wage community.
The regional wage benchmark and number of Chicago SMA municipalities 
falling above and below this benchmark are reported in Table 3.
Table 3
Chicago SMA Regional Wage Benchmark and Wage Ratio
Regional Wage Benchmark $71,088 or 1.00 wage ratio
Municipalities with Ratio > 1.00 35
Municipalities with Ratio < 1.00 44
N = 79
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As indicated by the data, the number of municipalities paying above the 
regional wage benchmark versus those paying below is roughly similar. It should be 
noted, however, that slightly over half (N = 40) of the municipalities cluster within 
.10 above or below the regional benchmark. Put another way, 40 out of 79 
municipalities have a market wage ratio ranging from .90 to 1.09. Only 18 
municipalities have a ratio greater than 1.10. This suggests that most municipalities 
pay near the mean, which is consistent with traditional scholarship, indicating that 
municipal officials are most comfortable paying an average market rate. In fact, when 
asked the question, “Which of the following compensation philosophies best describes 
your community?” the majority of survey respondents (N = 49 of 75) indicated, “We 
strive to pay at the mean/average rate.” Only 15 responded, “We strive to pay at a 
higher overall rate than other comparable municipalities in the region.” Thus, the 
actual number of communities paying a wage that is noticeably higher than the regional 
average and the number of respondents indicating that their community strives to pay 
an efficiency wage are largely consistent.
Reputational Service Quality Questionnaire
Each municipality that received a salary and fringe benefit survey was also sent 
a reputational service quality questionnaire to complete. For a copy of the reputational 
service quality questionnaire, as w ell as other supporting documentation, see Appendix 
E. In this survey, the respondent, or professional administrator, was asked to identify 
municipalities within his or her service region known for providing highly innovative, 
high-quality services. It was reasoned that professional administrators know each other
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quite w ell through their professional networks, making them relatively cognizant o f  
how well each other’s municipality is doing. The respondent could identify as many or 
as few communities as he or she wished for a variety of core service areas.
Respondents were also given the option to designate municipalities as offering high- 
quality services overall. This designation was based on the 11 core service areas listed 
in Appendix B and noted on the questionnaire. The logic behind the reputational 
service quality questionnaire was to ascertain whether highly reputable communities 
would arise from the mix by receiving multiple hits from different professional 
administrators.
Municipalities were assigned a reputational service quality (RSQ) score based 
on the number of mentions received; mentions for the “all services” category were 
weighted to account for each of the 11 service areas considered. Scores ranged from 
0 to 127, with an average score of ~ 20. Addressing the impact of wages on service 
quality via a reputational analysis adds a new dimension to the efficiency wage 
literature. Previous studies have typically attempted to measure service quality through 
some measure of productivity, such as the impact that Henry Ford’s decision to double 
autoworker wages had on production or Wiseman and Chatterjee’s (2003) research 
pertaining to the impact of wages on Major League Baseball.
Measuring service quality within the realm of the public sector is a relatively 
tenebrous process. Similar to private-sector manufacturing, municipalities produce 
many tangible outputs, such as new roads and police protection. Municipal outputs, 
however, differ greatly in that it is often difficult to gauge their true value. For 
example, quantifying the value of a new road or increased police protection is a less
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than straightforward process. While one could measure the m iles o f  new  road added or 
compare yearly crime rates, such measures do not take into account variations in 
service quality. In other words, knowing whether a public works department is highly 
productive does not mean it produces a higher quality of product. It is possible that 
some municipalities decide to repair damaged roads, either out of preference or 
necessity, while others prefer to simply replace such roads with brand-new roads. In a 
similar vein, crime rates do little to explain why one municipality experiences a 
reduction in crime while another sees an uptick. Policies, ordinances, and laws vary 
from community to community; it may be the case that a violation in one community is 
perfectly legal in another.
Simply put, this form of measurement is akin to comparing apples to oranges. 
Assessing perceived service quality, however, provides a uniform basis for comparison 
across a large regional area. It is readily acknowledged that this type of measurement is 
imperfect, as it cuts at only a single dimension of service quality. Put another way, 
perceived service quality does not definitively prove actual service quality. However, 
it is the view of the author that the reputational analysis employed in this study is a 
more reliable indicator of service quality than the other readily available methods.
Sociodemographic Information
Sociodemographic environmental data were gathered on each municipality and 
its respective population included in this study. As mentioned previously, the 
collection of this data was important insomuch as a municipality’s size, affluence, and 
demographics may explain more of why a city is perceived as having high-quality
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services than does its compensation strategy. Accordingly, any valid study on 
compensation must take into account the confounding effects of municipal size, 
affluence, number of employees, and budget.
Research Variables, Hypotheses, and Statistical Models
The data collected via the survey instruments, as well as the literature reviewed 
in the preceding chapter, guided the selection of the research variables, hypotheses, and 
statistical models used in this study. What follows is a discussion of the dependent and 
independent variables as well as a brief description of how they were measured. The 
research hypotheses from Chapter I are also restated and linked to the literature, 
followed by a description of the statistical models used to test these hypotheses.
Research Variables
The following independent variables were utilized for this study:
■ Market Wage Ratio
■ Efficiency Wage Rate
■ Municipal Size (population)
■ Municipal Workforce (total number of full-time employees per 1,000 population)
■ General Fund Expenditure (per 1,000 population)
■ Per Capita Income
■ Overall Municipal Wage Costs (per 1,000 population)
■ Reputational Service Quality (RSQ) Score
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The market wage ratio, as outlined earlier in this chapter, was calculated by 
dividing a municipality’s average wage rate by the regional wage benchmark. For this 
study, the regional wage benchmark represents the average wage rate paid by all 
municipalities in the Chicago SMA region. The efficiency wage rate represents the 
number of municipalities offering an above-market-clearing wage. The efficiency wage 
rate is coded as a dummy variable, where municipalities with a wage ratio above the 
regional wage benchmark are coded 1 and 0 otherwise. Municipal size represents a 
municipality’s total population based on 2004 U.S. Census Bureau data estimates. 
Municipal workforce represents the total number of full-time employees working in a 
municipality during 2005 per 1,000 population. The general fund expenditure 
represents the total budget expenditure less capital improvement expenditures for 
FY 2005 per 1,000 population. Per capita income represents 2000 U.S. Census Bureau 
data estimates. Overall municipal wage costs represent a municipality’s total wage 
costs for FY 2005 per 1,000 population. RSQ score served primarily as a dependent 
variable and, thus, is discussed below.
The following dependent variables were utilized for this study:
■ Reputational Service Quality (RSQ) Score
■ Turnover or Quit Rate
■ Accountability Control Mechanisms
■ W age Costs per Employee
The RSQ score reflects the total number of mentions, weighted for the “all 
services” category, a municipality received from professional administrators regarding 
service quality. The computation for turnover or quit rate was achieved by taking the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
68
number o f  em ployees who quit or otherwise left their position during 2005 divided by 
the total number of full-time employees during this same period. The number of 
accountability control mechanisms was calculated by summing the total number of 
control, or antishirking, mechanisms used in a given community. For example, whether 
a municipality conducts formal performance appraisals, has a merit-based 
compensation system, utilizes skill-based pay, or offers other nonmonetary incentives 
was ascertained. Finally, wage costs per employee represent the overall municipal 
wage costs during FY 2005 per 100 full-time employees.
Research Hypotheses
The research hypotheses tested in this study are divided into four primary 
categories: (1) Municipal Performance, Service Quality, and Productivity;
(2) Employee Turnover; (3) Accountability Control Mechanisms; and (4) Wage Costs 
per Employee. Readers should note that each category corresponds with a major tenet 
or model of efficiency wage theory. Moreover, the specific hypothesis being tested 
may be linked to existing literature on this topic as well as to the model for improved 
organizational outcomes depicted in Chapter I.
The hypothesis being tested for perceived reputational service quality is most 
closely aligned with the shirking model and wage-productivity model of efficiency 
wage theory:
■ Higher perceived reputational service quality is associated with higher wages when 
controlling for municipal size, workforce, per capita income, and general fund 
expenditure.
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The shirking model is predicated on the notion that efficiency wage creates 
incentives for high performance, as substandard performance may lead to unpleasant 
consequences for the employee. Adams (1965), Yellen (1984), and Stoft (1982) have 
offered support for this model. Calvo (1979, 1985), Eaton and White (1983), Foster 
and Wan (1984), and Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) have also found a correlation between 
higher wages, reduced shirking, and increased productivity.
The empirical evidence surrounding the wage-productivity model is relatively 
sparse. Henry Ford’s utilization of an efficiency wage to increase production is one 
example, as is Wiseman and Chatterjee’s (2003) research on the effects of salaries on 
team performance in Major League Baseball. From a practical standpoint, controlling 
for the effects of municipal population as well as affluence appears warranted. 
Moreover, controlling for the effects of organizational size (Brown & Medoff, 1985) 
and affluence (Dickens & Katz, 1987; Krueger & Summers, 1987) is supported by the 
literature more generally.
The hypothesis being tested for employee turnover is associated with the labor 
turnover model of efficiency wage theory:
■ Lower turnover or quit rate is associated with higher wages when controlling for 
municipal size, workforce, and overall wage costs.
Generally speaking, the labor turnover model asserts that turnover will decline 
when an organization offers a wage rate that is greater than the rate being offered by its 
competitors. Leonard (1987), Parsons (1977), Salop (1973), and Smith (1977) have 
provided support for this model. Less well known is whether the costs saved through 
reduced turnover are great enough to justify paying an efficiency wage. Although this
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study does not purport to address this question, it should be noted that previous research 
(Kim, 1999; Leonard, 1987; Powell et al., 1994) has found little justification for higher 
wages. Controlling for the effects of wages and organizational size has been advocated 
by Leonard (1987), whereas Powell et al. (1994) used a measure associated with per 
employee wage costs.
The hypothesis being tested for accountability control mechanisms is 
as follows:
■ Fewer accountability control mechanisms are associated with higher wages when 
controlling for municipal workforce, overall wage costs, and reputational service 
quality.
A hallmark of efficiency wage theory is that employees will automatically 
become more accountable to their organization when an above-market wage is offered. 
The reasons for increased accountability vary from a greater sense of individual 
responsibility (Akerlof, 1982, 1984; Arai, 1994; Taylor, 2003) to elicitation through 
threat or coercion (Katz, 1986; Stoft, 1982; Yellen, 1984). The question of whether 
higher wages translate into fewer employee controls has been relatively unexplored 
empirically. It is commonly held that effort is most readily measured where employees 
are made accountable through some type of control-oriented pay system, such as piece 
rates or commissions. However, contrary to popular belief, Brown and Medoff (1989) 
and Kruse (1992) found organizational size to be a better predictor o f  wages.
As discussed in Chapter II, a relative irony among public-sector organizations is 
that elected officials oftentimes place such a strong emphasis on employee 
accountability that the value associated with a reduction in supervision may not be
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
71
viewed as beneficial. Out of good reason, elected officials are concerned with the 
overall level of service quality being offered. However, it is conceivable that 
organizations already known for offering high-quality services are less inclined to 
closely monitor employees.
The hypothesis being tested for wage costs per employee cuts to the heart of 
efficiency wage theory insomuch as higher paying organizations are supposed to 
experience reductions in their overall costs associated with personnel:
■ Lower wage costs per employee are associated with higher wages when controlling 
for municipal size and per capita income.
Communities choosing to take advantage of the benefits associated with 
efficiency wage, such as decreased formal control mechanisms, improved service 
quality, and lower costs associated with turnover, should reduce overall and per 
employee costs, despite increased wage costs. Of course, whether this is the case 
depends on many factors. Controlling for the effects of organizational size (Leonard, 
1987) and affluence (Dickens & Katz, 1987; Krueger & Summers, 1987) makes sense 
from a theoretical standpoint. It is, however, conceivable that the more subtle cost- 
saving factors associated with efficiency wage are not adequately captured through 
empirical analysis.
Statistical Models
The statistical models used in this research are commonly practiced techniques 
in the social and behavioral sciences (McClendon, 2002; Meier & Brudney, 2001). 
Specifically, this research uses both bivariate correlational analysis and ordinary least
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squares (OLS) regression analysis. What follow s is a brief discussion o f  the techniques 
utilized and an explanation as to why they are appropriate for this study. The results of 
the statistical analysis are presented in Chapter IV.
Bivariate correlational analysis is a statistical technique used to measure the 
linear association between two variables that are typically comprised of interval-level 
data. In essence, correlation refers to a situation whereby only one independent variable 
(X) and one dependent variable (1) are being analyzed at a time (McClendon, 2002). In 
this study, the independent variable, market wage ratio, is correlated against a number 
of assumptions associated with efficiency wage theory. The resulting correlation 
coefficient, or r-value, is interpreted as the strength of the relationship between the 
variables. The most common correlation coefficient is the Pearson product-moment 
correlation, or Pearson’s correlation for short. A Pearson’s correlation ranges from 
-1 to 1, with a result of 0 indicating there is no linear relationship present (McClendon, 
2002).
OLS multiple regression serves as the primary statistical technique utilized in 
this study. Similar to correlational analysis, multiple regression is used to estimate the 
effects of variables in causal models (McClendon, 2002). OLS multiple regression, 
however, contrasts one dependent variable against two or more independent variables. 
This makes sense from the standpoint that most variables have more than one causal 
relationship. For instance, it is likely that wages alone do not explain all of the variation 
in perceived reputational service quality. Other variables, such as organizational size, 
level of affluence, and population, may also have some explanatory power.
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OLS multiple regression is most appropriate in situations where the data being 
analyzed is interval level, as is primarily the case in this study. OLS multiple regression 
produces some statistics that are useful in assessing causality. The first is the regression 
coefficient (b). Simply put, the regression coefficient is the average amount a 
dependent variable increases due to an independent variable, when all other independent 
variables in the model are held constant. Put another way, the b coefficient is the slope 
of the regression line: the larger the b, the steeper the slope. The second is the t- 
statistic and its related significance level. In social science research, a common rule of 
thumb is to drop any variables not significant at .05 or higher from the model (Meier & 
Brudney, 2001). The third is the standard error. Generally speaking, the standard error 
is useful for indicating the amount that b is likely to deviate from the entire population 
due to chance (McClendon, 2002). The fourth is the coefficient of multiple 
determination or, as it is more commonly known, R2. R2 is the percent of the variance 
in the dependent variable explained uniquely or jointly by the independent variable(s) in 
the model. Due to bias associated with the R2 statistic, the adjusted R2 will be reported 
in this study. The adjusted R2 attempts to correct any statistical bias by subtracting 
overestimates caused by random sampling errors (McClendon, 2002).
It should be pointed out that the model predicting accountability control 
mechanisms (see Table 9 in Chapter IV) faces a methodological hurdle in that the 
dependent variable is categorical in nature, ranging from 0 to 4. One possible solution 
might be to recode the dependent variable into either 0 or 1, indicating either the 
presence or absence of accountability controls. By making the dependent variable 
dichotomous, other statistical models, such as an ordered logit model, may be used.
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Logistic regression, however, utilizes maximum likelihood estimation, which typically 
requires a sample size larger than what is available in this research (Borooah, 2002). 
Given this, OLS multiple regression is viewed as the optimal technique for this 
situation; nevertheless, readers should note that other models were considered.
Case Study Analysis
In order to more firmly tether efficiency wage theory to practical administrative 
issues, a municipality was selected to serve as a case study. While intended to be 
primarily illustrative in nature, the case study provides readers with greater context 
pertaining to the more abstract qualities associated with efficiency wage theory. Simply 
put, the case study enables readers to see what an efficiency wage system looks like in 
practice. Based on its status as the prototypical efficiency wage community, the City of 
St. Charles, Illinois, was chosen for the case study.
When developing the case study, interviews were viewed as the best method in 
which to proceed. To this end, interviews were conducted with a small sample of 
current municipal officials. Specifically, the city administrator, public works director, 
and mayor were interviewed. These individuals were selected because they each play a 
vital role in the management or oversight of St. Charles’s personnel system and, thus, 
are uniquely qualified to comment on its operation.
A s a rule, each interview used the same set o f  questions and proceeded in a 
similar manner. Deviation from standard questions occurred when probing into 
individual-specific issues that varied based on administrative department or 
responsibility. Moreover, follow-up questions often deviated from the prescribed
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format when it was necessary to obtain a deeper understanding of a policy or issue.
This was especially true when discussing an employee’s specific role in the city’s 
compensation program. Interviews varied in length from approximately one hour to 
one hour and 30 minutes.
The first major focus of the interviews was on St. Charles’s decision to move 
toward an efficiency wage compensation strategy. In addition to identifying the 
impetus behind this decision, specific attention was paid to uncovering any obstacles or 
barriers that made the move more difficult. Generally speaking, the strategy employed 
by St. Charles highlights several key assumptions associated with the theory and 
practice of efficiency wage theory. In St. Charles, municipal officials assume that 
higher pay will result in better employee performance and, ultimately, cost 
effectiveness. Although paying less may initially be cheaper, such a strategy could lead 
to greater costs down the road, such as increased employee turnover, retraining costs, 
absenteeism, equipment sabotage, and inferior customer service. Moreover, officials 
are confident that by maintaining higher than market starting salaries they will be able 
to attract and recruit the best employees from the available applicant pool. As 
mentioned previously, Thurow (1975) refers to this as queue theory. When a job 
becomes available, potential job applicants form a queue competing for the position. 
Rational organizations strive to select candidates who have the best fit, the least need 
for training, and the best credentials. Thus, by paying more initially, an organization 
increases its odds of hiring optimal candidates.
The second major focus of the interviews was on the political environment and 
organizational culture necessary for an efficiency-wage-based compensation system to
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succeed. Generally speaking, within the municipal realm, the support of several 
different types of individuals is needed in order for an efficiency wage system to 
succeed. First, administrative officials must believe they currently have, or can attract, 
a workforce of sufficiently high quality to justify the payment of an above-market wage. 
Moreover, wages must be seen as the best method in which to retain these valued 
individuals. Second, the support of the elected board is critical. Given that efficiency 
wage theory sounds initially counterintuitive, it may raise political eyebrows. The idea 
of paying public employees more to reduce costs while also providing more services is 
a hard pill for some local elected officials to swallow. In the modern era, it is also not 
uncommon for some local elected officials to use their position as a stepping-stone to 
higher political office; thus, these individuals must be careful that their decision to 
substantially increase wages is politically feasible. Third, the employees must buy in to 
the program and the idea that more is expected of them in terms of performance and 
productivity.
The third major focus of the interviews was on the city’s ability to both monitor 
and measure employee performance and productivity. Put another way, how do 
municipal officials know if the compensation strategy is delivering what it promises?
St. Charles no longer monitors employee performance through traditional performance 
appraisals. The city assumes that its employees do not shirk and that they have an 
incentive to perform well. St. Charles also assumes that it hires better em ployees from 
larger applicant pools and retains them longer, thus reducing training costs. Further, by 
downplaying individual equity rewards (merit pay) connected with individual 
performance appraisal scores, employees should be less competitive among themselves
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and more prone to teamwork. Ostensibly, the probability of greater teamwork, coupled 
with increased skill levels and multitasking, should enable St. Charles to provide more 
with fewer employees. Ultimately, this should translate into better quality and quantity 
of services for St. Charles residents and taxpayers.
As previously mentioned, selecting the City of St. Charles, Illinois, to serve as a 
case study was ideal given its status as the prototypical efficiency wage community. 
Although the case study should be viewed as primarily illustrative, it nevertheless 
provides readers with a greater degree of context regarding the theoretical aspects of 
efficiency wage theory. Interviews provided the best mechanism by which to learn 
about the city’s compensation policies, procedures, and goals. To summarize, 
interviews focused on:
■ The city’s decision to move toward an efficiency wage strategy.
■ The political environment and organizational culture necessary for an efficiency- 
wage-based compensation system to succeed in St. Charles.
■ The city’s ability to both monitor and measure employee performance and 
productivity.
The findings associated with the case study are discussed in detail in Chapter V.
Timing of Implementation
Overall, the data collection process went smoothly, with the survey 
questionnaires mailed out and collected prior to the case study analysis. It was 
necessary to collect the survey data first, as these data serve as the primary source of 
information for this study and, hence, was viewed as most essential. Moreover, it was
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not known which municipalities would emerge as high paying, rendering it impossible 
to select a proper case study beforehand. A final reason for implementing the surveys 
prior to the case study was to weed out any communities that were not interested in 
further participation in this study.
In effect, the process of collecting survey data occurred first, followed by a 
single case study of St. Charles for contextual purposes. At ~ 48%, the survey response 
rate was higher than average in most cases for this type of research (Miller & Miller- 
Kobayashi, 2000). Generally speaking, municipalities concentrated in the north and 
northwestern suburbs were the most responsive; those concentrated in the south and far 
west were the least responsive.
Strengths and Weaknesses of This Design
The methodology used to test the model of improved organizational outcomes 
based on efficiency wage rates possesses several strengths. These include:
■ The research design and methodology used in this study builds on previous research 
on efficiency wage theory. This study is uniquely situated, however, in that it views 
efficiency wage exclusively through a public-sector lens.
■ The use of multiple data gathering techniques allows information to be collected 
from a number of sources, as opposed to relying on a single source. In addition, 
different data gathering techniques allow  for in-depth information to be gathered, 
bringing added richness to the findings.
■ Keeping this study regionally defined allows for a more in-depth study of municipal 
compensation and is, in general, an accurate reflection of the labor market.
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■ The Chicagoland region is fairly representative of other suburbanized areas located 
near a large central city. While the findings of this research cannot be generalized 
on a national level with statistical certainty, they should be fairly representative of 
other similarly situated municipalities in other regions.
While this study adds to existing research already undertaken on efficiency 
wage theory, it is unique in that it: (1) utilizes a sample comprised entirely of public- 
sector organizations and (2) introduces a novel approach to measuring the effect of 
wages on reputational service quality. If efficiency wage emerges as a strategic form of 
compensation in the public sector, municipal officials may begin to rethink how 
employees are initially attracted to an organization, monitored, and subsequently 
rewarded or punished.
The most compelling argument for restricting this study to the greater 
Chicagoland region is that it controls for variations in culture-based history, laws, and 
customs. A nationwide sample would entail additional research into forms of city 
government in other states and a detailed understanding of each locale’s policies, laws, 
and customs. Intuitively, this research lends itself to a single-region analysis in that the 
region is an accurate reflection of the local labor market. To this end, if this study were 
to be nationalized it would likely maintain a regional focus.
A further point to be made is that the local governments contained within the 
Chicago SMA are similar to most other major metropolitan areas. While it is true that 
slight variations in political culture, growth rates, per capita income, and so forth, likely 
exist, by and large the Chicagoland region is fairly typical of most major metropolitan 
areas along most of these lines. For instance, nearly 82% of ICMA member
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communities have populations of less than 50,000 (A. Richards, personal 
communication, February 14, 2007). All but five of the municipalities used in this 
research had populations of less than 50,000 people.
In light of the aforementioned strengths, there are a number of weaknesses that 
should be recognized. These include:
■ The meaningfulness of the reputational service quality variable can be questioned.
■ The effect that intervening variables, such as organizational culture or professional 
leadership, have on organizational performance is not accounted for.
■ Attitudinal data assessing employee perceptions about the use of efficiency wage is 
not a part of the analysis.
■ The effects of certain variables, such as those related to fringe benefits, are not 
included.
■ The impact, if any, that labor unions or the private sector have on municipal wage 
rates is not accounted for.
■ There is a lack of any initial measures associated with employee quality. It is not 
known whether efficiency wage communities are, in fact, hiring better qualified 
employees initially.
■ The findings of this research cannot be generalized on a national level with 
statistical certainty.
Admittedly, relying on a reputational analysis to assess service quality is a 
relatively crude measure. Accurately measuring service quality, however, is a complex 
problem that does not lend itself to any simple solutions. By surveying only 
professional administrators, who have a certain degree of familiarity with other
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organizations in their region, reliability is improved; this is reinforced through the data 
where several municipalities arose from the mix by receiving multiple mentions. In the 
future, it may be helpful to look at quality by service area. This, however, would 
require a significantly larger sample size than is currently available.
The model of improved organizational outcomes presented in Chapter I makes 
the assumption that there are a number of intervening variables that impact performance 
and productivity. Due to limitations associated with data, time, and resources, these 
variables are not examined in this study. While the case study may provide some 
context and insight regarding the effects of these variables, future research should 
undoubtedly be focused on this area.
The inclusion of attitudinal data assessing employee perceptions about the use of 
efficiency wage would add greater specificity to the analysis. As it stands, it is not 
known whether wages are the driving force behind performance and productivity.
There is research to suggest this is the case (Akerlof, 1982, 1984), as well as research to 
suggest otherwise (Bewley, 1998). It should be pointed out that this kind of data 
collection is extremely difficult and complex, as it requires a significant amount of 
personal and financial resources.
As previously discussed, this research does not attempt to create a model based 
on total compensation. Efficiency wage theory is premised on the notion that higher 
wages will lead to improved organizational outcomes; whether fringe benefits enter into 
this equation is not known. Given the difficulty associated with accurately converting 
or placing a dollar value on fringe benefits, the relative parity that exists between 
certain benefits (i.e., municipal pension plan participation) and the lack of any
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comprehensive fringe benefits database, including fringe benefits in the analysis, were 
viewed as more problematic than beneficial.
The effect of labor unions is not well documented in the literature. Katz (1986) 
noted that organizations might find it profitable to offer above-market wages to 
unionized employees or to limit what employees would otherwise receive through 
negotiation in an effort to maintain industrial peace. Organizations might also decide to 
offer non-unionized employees an efficiency wage in order to avoid a push toward 
collective bargaining. It should be noted that the overwhelming majority of 
municipalities included in this study have at least one collective bargaining unit 
represented, making statistical analysis impractical, if not impossible.
Including private-sector organizations in the sample would have confounded the 
analysis insomuch that it would require substantially different measures of 
organizational success. Put another way, profit serves as the primary measure of 
success in the private sector, whereas the public sector relies on the quality of services 
provided.
It is not known whether better qualified employees are being drawn to 
organizations offering higher wages. In fact, the adverse selection model is not directly 
tested by this research. This, in large part, is due to a lack of available data on 
employee quality. In instances where such data might be available, such as the physical 
and mental agility exam scores used by most police departments, this data is extremely 
sensitive and difficult to collect. Nevertheless, obtaining this type of data would add a 
certain degree of richness to the analysis.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Conclusion
83
This research is primarily concerned with building a model of improved 
organizational outcomes associated with efficiency wage theory. Specifically, this 
research has undertaken the question, “Does the relative placement of a public 
organization within an external compensation market have much effect on how 
successful it might be in producing desirable organizational outcomes?” Put another 
way, to what degree does external equity associate with employee behaviors and 
performance levels that public organizations would deem indicative of effectiveness and 
efficiency? A study design and research methodology relying primarily on quantitative 
data collection and analysis was chosen to address these questions. Two separate 
survey instruments were mailed to all ICMA-recognized municipalities. Moreover, a 
municipality was selected to serve as a case study. The case study is intended to be 
primarily illustrative in nature and provides readers with greater context regarding the 
more abstract qualities associated with efficiency wage theory.
Chapter IV presents the findings of quantitative analysis. Readers are also 
provided with an overview of certain key demographics related to the sample. In 
addition, emerging patterns in the survey data are addressed by pointing out illustrative 
examples. These examples have been culled from specific questions in the salary and 
fringe benefits survey that, while not appropriate for statistical analysis, help to better 
illustrate some key concepts.
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CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH FINDINGS:
PUTTING EFFICIENCY WAGE THEORY TO THE TEST
The primary purpose of Chapter IV is to present the findings of the statistical 
analysis. Specifically, using regression analysis, seven empirical models have been 
developed. A correlational analysis testing a variety of dependent variables against a 
single independent variable, market wage ratio, is also presented. This analysis is 
designed to test whether higher wages, in general, correlate significantly with the 
primary assumptions associated with efficiency wage theory.
Ultimately, this chapter hopes to show that variation in perceived reputational 
service quality, turnover or quit rate, accountability control mechanisms, and per 
employee wage costs are statistically associated with efficiency wage. Conversely, 
variation may also be due to sociodemographic factors, such as a municipality’s 
population, workforce, or level of affluence. It is hypothesized, as the model of 
improved organizational outcomes presented in Chapter I indicates, that variation is due 
to the interactions of several key variables. Variation is also likely due to one or more 
intervening variables, such as organizational culture or administrative leadership. 
However, due to methodological hurdles and limitations of the data, these variables are 
not part of the empirical analysis.
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Given these expectations, the actual aggregate survey findings reported in this 
chapter represent some unexpected outcomes. Some aspects of the research hypotheses, 
as well as the predictive model, seem borne out by the statistical analysis while other 
expected relationships are not. A summary of the statistical results is as follows:
■ Perceived reputational service quality increases as a municipality’s market wage 
ratio increases, controlling for municipal size (population), affluence (per capita 
income), municipal workforce (number of full-time employees per 1,000 
population), and general fund expenditure (per 1,000 population).
■ Perceived reputational service quality and the market wage ratio is a nonlinear 
relationship. As such, a quadratic specification was utilized in order to demonstrate 
that reputational service quality increases most dramatically above a market wage 
ratio of 1.00, controlling for municipal size, affluence, municipal workforce, and 
general fund expenditure.
■ Perceived reputation service quality reaches statistical significance at an efficiency 
wage rate of 1.13, or 13%, above the regional market average, controlling for 
municipal size, affluence, municipal workforce, and general fund expenditure.
■ Turnover or quit rates do not decrease as a municipality’s market wage ratio 
increases, controlling for municipal size, municipal workforce, and overall 
municipal wage costs.
■ Accountability control mechanisms are not significantly impacted by a 
municipality’s market wage ratio, controlling for municipal workforce, overall 
municipal wage costs, and perceived reputational service quality.
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■ Wage costs per employee increase as a municipality’s market wage ratio increases, 
controlling for municipal size and affluence.
As noted in the previous chapter, the salary and fringe benefits survey and 
reputational service quality questionnaire are included in Appendices D and E, 
respectively. Readers may find it helpful to reference these materials when considering 
the specific variables and their measurements used in each model. Prior to presenting 
the findings, readers are provided with an overview of the sociodemographic make-up 
of the sample.
Sociodemographic Data
The sociodemographic data presented in Table 4 is intended to inform readers of 
the breadth and scope of the sample. As can be seen, the municipalities in the sample 
vary in terms of population, organizational size, and level of affluence. This variation is 
tempered by other characteristics that all municipalities in the sample share in common, 
such as laws and customs. Moreover, the municipalities are located within the same 
regional labor market. This places them in competition with one another in terms of 
attracting and retaining quality employees. It should be noted, however, that specific 
municipalities typically develop smaller comparable groups within the broader region 
when establishing wage rates.
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Table 4
Sociodemographics of Municipalities in Study Sample
Variable Median Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Population 21,251 24,207 20,852.42 1,601 140,106
Per Capita Income 28,686 32,245 10,828.82 14,461 63,765
Municipal General Fund
Expenditure (SI,000) 14,476 15,910 11,423.48 1,317 59,578
Municipal Total Full-Time 
Employees
Market Wage Ratio 
N = 79
125 138 136.43 10 1,003
4,388 5,464 3,827.15 527 23,832
6.7 7.4 5.41 0 27.9
1 1 .13 .73 1.28
Correlational Analysis Testing Efficiency Wage Assumptions
The correlational analysis is intended to test whether a statistically significant 
relationship exists between the market wage ratio and several core assumptions 
associated with efficiency wage theory. Specifically, this analysis examines whether 
variation in perceived reputational service quality, turnover or quit rates, number of 
accountability control mechanisms, and wage costs per employee is due to variation in 
municipal wage rates. The findings of the analysis are presented in Table 5.
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Table 5
Correlations of Market Wage Ratio and Core Assumptions
Dependent Variable Market Wage Ratio
Reputational Service Quality (RSQ) Score .662***
Turnover or Quit Rates -.218#
Accountability Control Mechanisms .084
Overall Municipal Wage Costs .337**
per 100 Full-Time Employees 
N = 79
Note: # p < .10, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
As expected, a strong, statistically significant correlation (r = .662, p < .001) 
is present between the market wage ratio and RSQ score. Put another way, as 
municipal wage rates increase, a corresponding rise in reputational service quality 
occurs. This is consistent with the sociological aspect of efficiency wage theory; 
namely, higher wage rates enhance levels of performance and productivity among 
employees.
The market wage ratio and turnover or quit rates are negatively correlated 
(r = -.218). It should be noted that, from the perspective of statistical significance, this
finding is only weakly supported (p < .10). This, however, does not offset the fact that 
the correlation is in the expected direction and indicates that the market wage ratio, 
taken alone, has a measurable negative impact on turnover. The correlation coefficient 
between the market wage ratio and accountability control mechanisms (r = .084) does
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not achieve statistical significance. It is expected that wage rates and the number of 
accountability controls utilized will be negatively correlated, insomuch as higher wage 
rates decrease shirking and, thus, reduce the need to formally monitor employees.
A positive, moderately significant correlation (r = .337, p < .01) between the 
market wage ratio and overall municipal wage costs per employee is present. A finding 
of this nature is not surprising given that the direct relationship between higher wages 
and per employee costs is being measured. Moreover, proponents of efficiency wage 
theory do not contend that higher wages will necessarily reduce the size of an 
organization’s payroll; rather, cost savings are most often evidenced through other 
means, such as lower turnover rates or improved performance. Thus, while an 
organization may technically spend more on wages, it will experience savings in other 
areas, such as reductions in hiring costs due to decreased turnover, which ultimately 
exceed the costs associated with higher wages. However, it may simply be the case that 
organizations “get what they pay for.” In this sense, higher wages produce a number of 
desirable benefits, but at an increased cost to the organization.
The preceding discussion indicates that, with the exception of accountability 
control mechanisms, a statistically significant relationship exists between the market 
wage ratio and the primary dependent variables utilized in this study. Specifically, the 
findings demonstrate that higher wages: (1) enhance reputational service quality,
(2) reduce turnover or quit rate, and (3) are positively correlated with wage costs per 
employee.
While these relationships are present at the bivariate level, it is necessary to 
examine them within a multivariate context in order to become more confident that they
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are not spurious. The section that follows presents the findings of the OLS multiple 
regression analysis. The models test the relationship between the primary tenets of 
efficiency wage theory and the market wage ratio, controlling for a number of 
sociodemographic characteristics.
Hypothesis Testing Using Ordinary Least Squares Multiple Regression
Ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression is used in this study to test the 
primary theoretical components of efficiency wage theory against a variety of 
sociodemographic control variables. The seven models presented demonstrate the 
potential benefits and costs associated with paying higher wages. More importantly, 
these models provide a partial answer to the question of whether public-sector 
organizations can effectively utilize efficiency wage rates to leverage more out of their 
employees. From a methodological standpoint, OLS multiple regression places wage 
rates under a much more stringent test than correlational analysis. Coupling the market 
wage ratio with other sociodemographic variables serves as a more valid indicator of 
the true ability of wages to influence organizational outcomes associated with efficiency 
wage theory.
It should be pointed out that the independent variable of primary importance in 
each OLS model is either the market wage ratio or the efficiency wage rate. The market 
wage ratio ranges from 0.73 to 1.27, with 1.00 representing the regional wage  
benchmark. The efficiency wage rate represents the extent in which a municipality falls 
above or below the regional wage benchmark. In this study, municipalities paying 
above this benchmark and, hence, having a wage ratio greater than 1.00 pay an
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efficiency wage rate; those that pay below this benchmark or have a ratio less than 1.00 
are not considered to be an efficiency wage community.
Predicting Reputational Service Quality fRSO) Score
The first model predicts the relationship between reputational service quality 
(RSQ) score and the market wage ratio, controlling for municipal size, per capita 
income, municipal workforce, and general fund expenditure. The dependent variable, 
RSQ score, represents the number of times a professional administrator recognized a 
municipality as having a reputation for providing high-quality service in a particular 
service area. The results of the analysis are presented in Model 1, Table 6.
The results show that the market wage ratio is a significant predictor of RSQ 
score, all else equal. As hypothesized, the coefficient for municipal size signifies that 
for every 1,000 increase in population RSQ score increases by .592 (p < .001), ceteris 
paribus. The coefficient for per capita income indicates that level of affluence is a 
significant predictor of reputational service quality, all else equal. In other words, for 
every $1,000 increase in per capita income, a municipality can expect a .455 (p < .05) 
rise in RSQ score. Interestingly, municipal workforce does not appear to be a 
significant predictor of reputational service quality, all else equal. This finding runs 
counter to previous research on efficiency wage theory (Brown & Medoff, 1985),
suggesting that larger organizations are better able to leverage more from their
employees and, thus, provide a higher overall level of services.
Finally, the coefficient for general fund expenditure is not shown to be a significant 
predictor of reputational service quality, ceteris paribus. This finding runs
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Table 6
Regression Analysis Predicting Reputational Service Quality (RSQ) Score 
Independent Variable___________________ Model 1____________Model 2
Market Wage Ratio 51.460* -704.733**
(22.833) (195.876)
Market Wage Ratio2 — 388.279***
(91.333)
Municipal Size (1,000) 2 9 2*** .503***
(.131) (.122)
Per Capita Income ($1,000) .455* .291
(.216) (.202)
Municipal Workforce .111 .170
per 1,000 Population (.665) (.607)
General Fund Expenditure .000 .000




Adj. R2 .531 .609
F-Statistic 18.236*** 20.721***
N 76 76
Note: Dependent variable, RSQ score, represents the number of times a professional 
administrator recognized a municipality as having a reputation for providing high- 
quality service in a particular area.
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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counter to previous literature (Dickens & Katz, 1987; Krueger & Summers, 1987), 
indicating that more affluent organizations are likely able to pay higher wages, which, 
in turn, should translate into higher levels of performance and productivity on the part 
of employees. From a practical standpoint, however, smaller municipalities can be 
perceived as offering higher quality services, which may explain why a municipality’s 
general fund expenditure is not predictive of reputational service quality.
The value of the adjusted R2 is .531. This is significant in that the model is 
explaining a relatively large amount of the variation in reputational service quality. Put 
another way, ~ 53% of the variation in reputational service quality can be explained by 
the variables in the model. This finding should comfort professional administrators 
who question their municipality’s relative wage position in their respective regional 
labor market. Of course, this finding must be tempered with the realization that the 
dependent variable is based on a measure of perceived service quality, as opposed to an 
actual measure of service quality. Regardless, it appears that the predictive quality of 
the market wage ratio, all else equal, is significant.
Professional administrators may also question: “If the model is only explaining 
~ 53% of reputational service quality, what explains the rest?” The answer to this query 
likely lies in the intervening variables not included in the empirical analysis. That is, 
factors such as organizational culture, administrative leadership, and political 
environment might also play a role in projecting an image o f  an organization, which, in 
turn, may impact the perceived level of service quality as well as the actual.
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The second model presented in Table 6 includes a quadratic specification. After 
running diagnostics on the relationship between the dependent variable, RSQ score, and 
the primary independent variable market wage ratio, a nonlinear relationship was 
discovered. A nonlinear relationship indicates that the slope of the function that relates 
the dependent variable (7) to the independent variable (X) is not the same for all values 
of X  (McClendon, 2002). In this sense, the effect of the independent variable can either 
rise or decline or change signs from positive to negative as the values of X  increase.
The linear model (Model 1) implies that an increase in the market wage ratio, 
for example, from .70 to .80 (30 to 40% below the regional wage benchmark), has the 
same effect on reputational service quality as an increase in the market wage ratio from 
1.10 to 1.20 (10 to 20% above the regional wage benchmark). The quadratic model 
(Model 2), however, shows that reputational service quality is higher at points where 
the market wage ratio exceeds 1.00. For a graphical representation of the relationship 
between reputational service quality (RSQ) score and market wage ratio, denoting the 
quadratic fit line, see Figure 3.
Following this logic, a municipality garners a higher RSQ score the higher its 
market wage ratio. From this standpoint, for example, the increase in reputational 
service quality that results from paying a market wage ratio of 1.10 is not as great as 
paying a market wage ratio of 1.20. The overall fit of the quadratic model (R = .609) 
is increased noticeably over the linear model, lending further support for utilizing this 
specification. While organizations offering wages in excess of the regional wage 
benchmark are considered as paying efficiency wages, it is prudent to question: “How 
far above this benchmark must a municipality pay in order to receive an optimal benefit
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Figure 3. Scatterplot of reputational service quality (RSQ) score and 
market wage ratio.
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Table 7
Regression Analysis Predicting Reputational Service Quality (RSQ) Score at
Efficiency Wage Rate Tipping Points
Independent Variable Model 1____________Model 2
Efficiency Wage Rate at 1.00 5.751
(5.046)
Efficiency Wage Rate at 1.13 12.440*
(6.068)
Municipal Size (1,000) 72 5 *** 572 ***
(.120) (.114)
Per Capita Income ($1,000) .638** .593**
(.2 0 0 ) (.191)
Municipal Workforce .004 -.038
Per 1,000 Population (.684) (.6 6 8 )
General Fund Expenditure .000 .000




Adj. R2 .507 .526
F-Statistic 16.624*** 17.862***
N 76 76
Note: Dependent variable, RSQ score, represents the number o f  tim es a professional 
administrator recognized a municipality as having a reputation for providing high- 
quality service in a particular area.
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Two separate models are presented in Table 7. These m odels predict the 
relationship between perceived reputational service quality and the efficiency wage rate 
at separate cut or tipping points, controlling for municipal size, per capita income, 
municipal workforce, and general fund expenditure. The efficiency wage rate is coded 
as a dummy variable, where, in the first model, municipalities with a wage ratio of 1.00 
or greater are coded 1 and 0 otherwise, and, in the second model, municipalities with a 
wage ratio of 1.13 or greater are coded 1 and 0 otherwise.
The results of the first model show that an efficiency wage rate of 1.00 or 
greater is not a significant predictor of reputational service quality, all else equal. The 
coefficient for municipal size indicates that population is a significant predictor of 
reputational service quality, ceteris paribus. For every 1,000 increase in population, a 
municipality’s RSQ score increases by .715 (p < .001). Per capita income is also a 
significant predictor of reputational service quality, all else equal. In this instance, for 
every $1,000 increase in per capita income, a municipality’s RSQ score increases by 
.638 (p < .01). These results comport nicely with existing literature indicating that 
larger, more affluent organizations may be able to leverage more out of their workers.
In order to determine the tipping point where efficiency wage rates predict 
reputational service quality, the model was retested at numerous ratios. The results of 
the second model show that an efficiency wage rate of 1.13 or greater is a statistically 
significant predictor of reputational service quality, all else equal. Put another way, 
municipalities need to offer a wage rate that exceeds the regional wage benchmark by 
13% in order to see a significant increase in their perceived reputational service quality. 
The coefficient for the efficiency wage rate is 12.440 (p < .05), which indicates that
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municipalities with an efficiency wage rate of 1.13 or greater will receive an increase in 
RSQ score of ~ 12.
These results suggest that municipalities wanting to enhance perceptions of 
service quality through efficiency wages will have to exceed the market-clearing rate by 
approximately 13%. This is important insomuch as municipalities paying below this 
rate, yet in excess of the regional wage benchmark, are likely not receiving much, if 
any, more benefit than municipalities offering an average wage. Similarly, 
municipalities offering wages substantially above the 13% threshold may not receive 
any additional benefit and, thus, are paying more than is necessary.
Predicting Turnover or Quit Rate
In this model the relationship between turnover or quit rate and the market wage 
ratio, controlling for municipal size, municipal workforce, and overall wage costs, is 
examined. The dependent variable, turnover or quit rate, represents the total percentage 
of employees in a municipality who resigned from their position in 2005. The results of 
the analysis are presented in Table 8 .
The results show that the market wage ratio is not a significant predictor of turnover or 
quit rate, all else equal. Although the coefficient is weakly significant at 
.10, the F-statistic indicates that the overall model is not significant. Moreover, 
municipal size, municipal workforce, and overall wage costs are not significant 
predictors of turnover or quit rate, ceteris paribus. One might surmise that 
organizations located in more highly or densely populated areas offer more
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Table 8























Note: Dependent variable, turnover or quit rates, represents the total percentage of 
municipal employees who resigned from their position in 2005.
# p < .10, ** p < .01
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opportunities for employment. Increased opportunities for employment might, in turn, 
decrease an organization’s ability to sustain low turnover regardless of the wage rate 
being offered. This logic is similar to Kim (1999), who noted that the unemployment 
rate emerged as the best overall predictor of turnover. In this sense, prior to deciding 
whether to separate from an organization, employees may first examine the outside 
environment to see if such a decision is feasible.
The factors responsible for turnover are likely attributable to other variables not 
included in the model, such as special financial incentives offered by an organization 
(Wilson & Peel, 1991). Intervening variables, such as the organizational culture, 
political environment, and professional leadership found in an organization, are also 
likely to influence turnover. Organizations with lower turnover may spend less time 
and resources overseeing and directing more experienced employees. This would result 
in additional cost savings, which are not captured in the model.
Of course, whether such savings would be enough to justify any increased costs 
due to higher wages is subject to debate. Previous literature (Kim, 1999; Leonard,
1987; Powell et al., 1994) has attempted to measure this by contrasting the cost of 
higher wages against the cost associated with employee recruitment and training. In 
these instances, the marginal reduction in turnover achieved was not enough to warrant 
the added cost associated with higher wages. Finally, considering the relative parity of 
the sample, controlling for labor union representation and the unemployment rate would  
add little explanatory power to the model.
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In this model, the relationship between accountability control mechanisms and 
the market wage ratio, controlling for municipal workforce, overall wage costs, and 
reputational service quality, is examined. The dependent variable, accountability 
control mechanisms, represents the number of controls or performance measure 
mechanisms used by a municipality to monitor employee behavior. The results of the 
analysis are presented in Table 9.
The results show that the variables in the model are not a significant predictor of 
variation in accountability control mechanisms. The adjusted R2 of -.020 indicates that 
the variables do not supply additional leverage in predicting the values of the dependent 
variable. Typically, the R2 value will increase as additional independent variables are 
added to a model. The adjusted R2, however, is a more demanding model fit statistic. 
Given that the value is negative, it is a clear indication that the variables specified are 
essentially useless in predicting variation in accountability controls.
Three possible reasons can be readily identified for the poor outcome of this 
model. First, the range of the dependent variable is very narrow. Municipalities were 
surveyed as to whether they: (1) utilize formal performance appraisals, (2) offer skill- 
based pay, (3) base salary increases on merit, or (4) offer other nonmonetary incentives. 
The majority of the municipalities were identified as using most, if not all, of these 
control mechanisms. This created a very narrow index in which to conduct statistical 
analysis. Other techniques, such as an ordered logit model, were considered. However, 
given limitations in sample size, this technique was as equally problematic.
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Table 9
Regression Analysis Predicting Accountability Control Mechanisms
Independent Variable___________________B_________________ S.E.
Market Wage Ratio .299 1.031
Reputational Service Quality .003 .006
Municipal Workforce -.013 .037
per 1,000 Population







Note: Dependent variable, accountability control mechanisms, represents the number of 
controls or performance measure mechanisms used by a municipality to monitor 
employee behavior.
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Second, as previously discussed, elected officials oftentimes place such a strong 
emphasis on employee accountability that the value associated with a reduction in 
supervision may not be viewed as beneficial. In this sense, higher wages may not 
substitute for fewer employee accountability controls. Rather, it is plausible that elected 
officials in higher wage municipalities will actually be more inclined to closely monitor 
employees.
Third, the degree in which a municipality monitors or controls its employees is 
difficult to capture through aggregate survey data. This kind of measurement is likely 
better suited for a qualitative research methodology, where the more abstract qualities 
of employee accountability, such as employee trust and autonomy, can be captured. For 
example, a micro study, comprised of a small number of organizations, assessing 
employee opinions regarding accountability controls would yield a much richer and 
more comprehensive analysis.
Predicting Wage Costs per Employee
The final model examines the relationship between wage costs per employee 
and the market wage ratio, controlling for municipal size and per capita income. The 
dependent variable, wage costs per employee, represents the overall wage costs per 
100 full-time employees for a given municipality during FY 2005. The results of the
analysis are presented in Table 10.
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Table 10
Independent Variable B S.E.
Market Wage Ratio 119,308.029* 37,320.471
Municipal Size (1,000) 178.520 269.508






Note: Dependent variable, wage costs per full-time employees, represents the overall 
municipal wage costs during FY 2005 per 100 full-time employees.
** p < .01, * p < .05
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The results show that the market wage ratio is a significant predictor of wage 
costs per employee, all else equal. However, contrary to what was predicted, wage 
costs per employee increase as the market ratio increases. Here, a one-unit rise (from 
1.0 to 2.0) in the market wage ratio increases wage costs per 100 full-time employees 
by ~ $119,308 (p < .05). Intuitively, this finding makes sense; increasing the market 
wage ratio should correspond with higher per employee wage costs. Conversely, this 
finding does not take into account the more subtle cost-saving factors likely associated 
with higher wages. For instance, reductions in costs due to higher service quality are 
not included in the model.
The coefficient for per capita income indicates that the level of affluence is a 
significant predictor of overall wage costs, ceteris paribus (p < .05). The negative 
direction of the coefficient suggests that more affluent communities maintain lower per 
employee wage costs. Municipal size is not a significant predictor of overall wage 
costs. Finally, the adjusted R of the model is .182, suggesting that considerable 
variation in overall wage costs is not being captured by the model.
Conclusion
The overarching goal of this research was to answer the question of whether 
employee wages are positively correlated with performance and productivity. The
answer to this question has important ramifications for a number o f  deeply held beliefs
regarding public-sector compensation, such as starting pay and performance-based 
incentives. Generally speaking, the findings presented in this chapter amass a degree of
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evidence in favor o f  efficiency wage theory. The empirical m odels tested assumptions 
associated with the shirking model, wage-productivity model, and labor turnover model.
As hypothesized, the market wage ratio was found to be a significant predictor 
of perceived reputational service quality. Given the nonlinear nature of this 
relationship, a tipping point was identified whereby efficiency wage rates have the 
greatest impact on perceived service quality. Municipal size and affluence are also 
associated with reputational service quality; however, these variables do not predict 
turnover or quit rate. In addition, the market wage ratio was found to be a significant 
predictor of wage costs per employee; however, this relationship was not in the 
expected direction. No definitive evidence was found in support of the hypotheses 
regarding accountability control mechanisms.
Chapter V makes recommendations regarding the utilization of efficiency wage 
theory as a method for strategic compensation in the public sector. When drawing 
conclusions, the results of the statistical analysis, as well as the case study, are relied 
upon. Ways in which municipal government professionals might utilize this study’s 
findings to guide their own compensation policies are considered. Most of these 
revolve around linking wages to improved organizational outcomes. Finally, this 
chapter provides a basis for future research and, hopefully, some ideas for others to 
follow up on what has already been completed.
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CHAPTER V
THE POTENTIAL FOR AN EFFICIENCY WAGE STRATEGY 
TO FUNCTION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Intended as a bookend to the dissertation, Chapter V is comprised of three 
primary sections. First, the implications of the research findings are discussed. Many 
of these implications settle around the notion of higher wages and, when applicable, 
efficiency wage as a tool for strategic compensation in the public sector. Second, an 
illustrative case study is presented. Due to its status as the prototypical efficiency wage 
community, the City of St. Charles, Illinois, was selected for the case study. The case 
study was designed to demonstrate the potential for an efficiency wage strategy to 
function in a public-sector organization. Moreover, the practical benefits and hurdles 
that St. Charles has encountered while operating under an efficiency wage system are 
addressed. Third, questions surrounding the future of compensation in the public sector 
and how efficiency wage may fit into the picture are outlined. Finally, this chapter 
provides a basis for future research and, hopefully, offers questions for others to follow 
up on regarding the loose ends of efficiency wage theory and practice.
It is important to note that the findings o f  this research are consistent with 
previous studies conducted primarily within the private sector. While not all of the 
primary tenets associated with efficiency wage theory are brought to bear through the 
statistical analysis, some are supported. This is significant in that it demonstrates the
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potential benefits of utilizing an efficiency wage strategy in the public sector. Any 
variance in findings points to a need for further research, which would likely entail 
expanding the scope of the study to encompass more than one regional labor market. In 
addition, future research should strive to gain a broader understanding of how potential 
intervening variables, such as organizational culture or professional leadership, impact 
the relationship between wages and organizational performance and productivity. 
Ultimately, the jury is still out regarding the generalizability of the research findings. 
Regardless, a number of implications can be readily drawn from the analysis.
Implications of the Research Findings
The implications of the research findings become clear through a discussion of 
four major topic areas. First, the most obvious implication for this research is the 
linkage between efficiency wage and reputational service quality. The findings indicate 
that efficiency wage is a significant predictor of higher levels of perceived reputational 
service quality, all else equal. Whether perceived service quality is an accurate 
predictor of actual service quality is debatable. What can be construed, however, is that 
municipalities garnering higher RSQ scores also have a known reputation for providing 
exceptional services. Moreover, there is a positive association between a municipality’s 
relative position within the regional labor market and its perceived level of service 
quality.
The implication is that highly regarded municipalities may leverage their 
reputation as a tool for increasing economic development or for attracting more affluent 
residents to the community. More narrowly, municipalities may use reputation as a
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vehicle for attracting and retaining employees to the organization. Simply put, being 
regarded as a service leader within a regional market may lead to other positive or 
desirable outcomes for the community. In this sense, municipalities benefit from 
paying above-market wage rates. This should, however, be tempered by the fact that 
municipal size and affluence were also shown to be significant predictors of higher 
reputational service quality. It could be that larger or more affluent municipalities are 
viewed as de facto service leaders within the region. While size and affluence matter, 
the independent predictive quality associated with efficiency wage should not be 
ignored.
Another implication of the link between efficiency wage and higher reputational 
service quality may come about as a consequence of more communities moving toward 
this compensation strategy. As previously noted, as the number of municipalities 
striving to pay above-market wage increases, the distance between higher paying and 
lower paying organizations will be compressed. This, in turn, can result in higher 
overall compensation costs for organizations within the same market without yielding 
the same level of positive effects on service quality. The implication of this would be to 
place additional financial pressure on municipalities as they jockey to sustain or 
improve their perceived level of service quality.
The second set of implications occurs as a result of the association between 
higher wages and turnover or quit rate. The findings show that the market w age ratio is 
not a significant predictor of turnover or quit rate, ceteris paribus. This finding is 
counter to Leavitt (1996), who found that employees working for the Denver, Colorado, 
municipal water utility, a high-wage organization with very low turnover, expressed a
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high degree of dissatisfaction when discussing their chances for advancement within the 
organization. Leavitt (1996) attributed the problem to organizational stagnation due to 
exceedingly low turnover caused by the organization’s high wage strategy.
By nature, lower turnover corresponds with tenure stability. Increased tenure 
stability reduces the number of times that a municipality’s organizational culture is 
disrupted by changing personnel. Each time a new person enters the organization, there 
is a period of learning and adjustment that must occur prior to reaching full operating 
effectiveness. This can have the effect of decreasing performance and productivity, 
ultimately impacting service quality. This does not appear to be an issue among the 
higher wage municipalities included in this study; however, future research should 
examine the relationship between wages and turnover more fully.
The third set of implications occurs as a result of the association between higher 
wages and wage costs per employee. The findings show that the market wage ratio is a 
significant predictor of increased wage costs per employee, all else equal. While this 
correlation is likely apt, it does not take into account the more subtle cost-saving factors 
associated with paying higher wages. For instance, reductions in costs, due to higher 
reputational service quality, are not included in the empirical analysis. Increases in 
employee morale and self-satisfaction may also be connected to higher wages (Akerlof,
1984).
By implication, municipalities considering the findings o f  this research should 
question whether the potential benefits, not measured in this study, outweigh the direct 
costs associated with paying higher wages. Failing to take these variables into 
consideration leads to the conclusion that a high-wage compensation strategy is more
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costly than the alternative. In turn, this could provide elected officials, who may be 
dubious of the theoretical underpinnings associated with efficiency wage, with the 
ammunition needed to reject any move toward higher wages. Conversely, it may 
simply cause municipalities to invoke the old adage, “You get what you pay for.” This 
mentality would likely permeate through an organization, creating an expectation of 
increased performance and productivity among the employees. Put another way, 
employees would likely respond to the knowledge they are being rewarded highly by 
increasing their output accordingly (Adams, 1965).
The fourth set of implications entails the association, or lack thereof, between 
higher wages and accountability control mechanisms. The findings show that the 
market wage ratio is not a significant predictor of variation in accountability control 
mechanisms. In fact, none of the variables included in the model reach statistical 
significance. The implication of this finding is that municipal employees, regardless of 
wage level, municipal size, wage costs, and reputational service quality, experience 
very little variation in supervisor intensity. This runs counter to research by Groshen 
and Krueger (1990), Kruse (1992), and Leonard (1987), who found a correlation 
between rate of pay and supervisor intensity.
As mentioned previously, the public sector may be unique in that elected 
officials place a high value on employee accountability. Without formal evaluation 
methods in place, such as written performance appraisals, elected officials are unable to 
accurately determine whether employees are performing at a high level. Given this, it 
appears that very few municipalities, regardless of whether they offer higher wages, 
have abolished their conventional performance appraisal process. Regardless, as more
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municipalities adopt a higher wage compensation strategy, de-emphasizing traditional 
accountability control mechanisms should be considered as an additional way to reduce 
costs.
In sum, the efficiency wage rates were found to be a significant predictor of 
higher reputational service quality. Sociodemographic variables, such as municipal size 
and affluence, were also found to be associated with reputational service quality, but not 
with turnover or quit rate. Higher wages, however, were not found to be a significant 
predictor of turnover or quit rate or accountability control mechanisms. Although the 
result was not in the expected direction, the market wage ratio was found to be a 
significant predictor of wage costs per employee.
Assessing the Model for Understanding Improved Organizational 
Outcomes Associated with Efficiency Wage Rates
The model developed in Chapter I for understanding improved organizational 
outcomes associated with efficiency wage rates is both supported and not supported 
under empirical scrutiny. For instance, while efficiency wage rates were a predictor of 
variation in reputational service quality, they were unable to explain variance in 
turnover or quite rate, accountability control mechanisms, and wage costs per employee. 
Variation in the predictive quality of the sociodemographic control variables was also 
present. For example, municipal size was found to be a significant predictor of 
reputational service quality, but not wage costs per employee or turnover rate.
Per capita income was found to be a significant predictor of wage costs per 
employee as well as reputational service quality. Somewhat surprising was the inability
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of municipal workforce to predict, with statistical significance, variation in any of the 
dependent variables. This finding is counter to previous research (Brown & Medoff,
1985) suggesting an association between organizational size and level of performance 
and productivity. Finally, it is not known whether or to what extent the culturally based 
intervening variables predict variation in organizational performance and productivity, 
as such variables fall outside the purview of this study.
The overall impact of these findings on the model is not yet fully known. The 
perceived shortcomings of the model require further examination before a more 
definitive statement regarding their predictive qualities can be assessed. Similarly, the 
influence of the intervening variables contained in the model is simply not known. 
Without question, this model will continue to evolve as this research is expanded to 
other regional labor markets and as more research is conducted on the intervening 
variables.
To provide a richer context to the research findings, as well as to better 
illuminate the assumptions associated with efficiency wage theory, attention will now 
turn to a case study analysis. This case study demonstrates how an actual efficiency 
wage system functions in a public-sector organization. Pointing out illustrative 
examples found in the case study and relaying them to the model depicted in this 
analysis can develop a more holistic view of a higher wage and, more narrowly, 
efficiency wage strategy for the public sector. Due to its status as the prototypical 
efficiency wage community, the City of St. Charles, Illinois, was selected for the case 
study.
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Case Study Analysis: St. Charles, Illinois
The City of St. Charles, Illinois, is a picturesque community situated along the 
banks of the Fox River in the far-western Chicagoland region. With a land area of 15.9 
miles and a population near 32,000, the city boasts a balanced mix of retailers, 
restaurants, and manufacturing facilities (Community Profile, 2006). For an overview 
of socioeconomic and demographic data for St. Charles, see Table 11.
Table 11
Socioeconomic and Demographic Data for St. Charles. Illinois
Total Population (2005) 31,834*
Population > 25 years of age 18,134**
Education > High school diploma 16,603**
Education > Bachelor’s degree 7,787**
Median Household Income (1999) $69,424**
Per Capita Income (1999) $33,969**
Note: * Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission; **U.S. Census Bureau, 2000
By all accounts, St. Charles is an affluent, growing community with a penchant 
for providing high-quality services to its residents. However, not unlike many Chicago- 
area suburbs, St. Charles is currently undertaking an effort to revitalize its downtown 
district. This includes adding an additional 200,000 square feet of retail and office 
space, 96 housing units, and two parking facilities (Community Profile, 2006). The city
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is met on all sides by the borders of neighboring communities. This leaves little 
potential for future growth through annexation, making the success of the downtown 
revitalization project acutely important for continued robust economic expansion in the 
community.
In Illinois, any municipality with a population of more than 25,000 is 
automatically a home-rule unit. Essentially, this grants St. Charles, “the power to 
regulate for the protection of public health, safety, morals and welfare; to license; to 
tax; and to incur debt” (Illinois State Constitution, 1970, Article VII, Section 6). The 
city has an aldermanic form of government with a professional city administrator 
responsible for the day-to-day municipal operations. The council is comprised of two 
members from each of the five wards, with a mayor elected at-large. The combination 
of home-rule status coupled with a professional administrator allows the city a great 
deal of flexibility in all facets of its organizational operation.
In 2003, the City of St. Charles did something novel: it developed a new 
compensation strategy based on an efficiency wage model. Specifically, in an effort to 
recruit, retain, and motivate employees, the city decided to pay its staff at the 75th 
quartile of its comparable market communities. By way of an annual salary survey, 
wages are recalculated in order to maintain the 75th quartile benchmark. St. Charles 
eliminated performance-based or merit pay and cost-of-living adjustments because the 
city felt that its relative market position, updated annually, mitigated any need for 
annual cost-of-living increments. In addition, the city abolished its conventional system 
of formal written evaluations and replaced them with periodic coaching or feedback 
sessions for both union and non-union employees.
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When determining wage rates, the city’s compensation plan takes into account 
internal, individual, and external equity. This helps to ensure that wage rates are set in 
accordance with the complexity of a position, the relationship of that position to all 
other positions within the organization, and the relationship of that position to positions 
of similar qualifications and responsibilities in comparable communities. The hallmark 
of the plan, however, is its reliance upon measures of external equity. As previously 
noted, the city conducts an annual salary survey, which is sent to a sample of 
comparable communities.
The following criteria are used to determine whether a community is considered 
comparable: (1) the equalized assessed value per capita of the community must be 
between $18,539 - $55,617; (2) the community must be located less than 20 miles from 
the St. Charles City Hall; and (3) the community’s corporate budget must be greater 
than $14,941,930 (City of St. Charles, 2006). Not all of the communities meeting these 
criteria are included in the survey; rather, St. Charles utilizes a select group comprised 
of 23 communities. For a list of the city’s comparable communities, see Appendix F. It 
should be noted that the list of comparables contains a broad range of municipalities in 
terms of economic and demographic make-up. These communities, according to the 
city’s mayor, represent the “best” municipalities in the Chicagoland region 
(D. DeWitte, personal communication, February 2, 2007).
By relying on a list of comparable communities to determine its pay ranges,
St. Charles is establishing a market-based salary schedule. From a practical standpoint, 
it is not difficult to see the impact that the communities chosen as comparables have on 
the city’s ultimate position in the labor market. In fact, it is not uncommon for
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disagreement among interested parties to arise regarding the criteria used to determine 
the list of comparable communities. For example, criteria such as size, level of 
affluence, and distance may all become a point of contention. It may also be the case 
that a municipality is selected or excluded not so much for its demographic or economic 
compatibility, but based on some other factor. Ultimately, the determination of 
comparable communities is a political decision that must be approved by the elected 
board. In addition, the elected board must approve any alteration to the set of 
comparable communities due to the broad financial implications associated with such a 
decision.
The criteria used by St. Charles to determine its list of comparable communities 
results in a generous wage system. This is because the city’s criteria have only set a 
minimum or baseline for comparison, with no specific ceiling in place. Put another 
way, none of the communities chosen as comparables are smaller or less affluent than 
St. Charles; rather, many are larger, with greater budgets and higher levels of economic 
development. Under this scenario, St. Charles’s relative wage position within the 
regional labor market rivals that of any community regardless of size or level of 
affluence.
St. Charles’s pay ranges are managed using a traditional grade and step system. 
Moreover, the city, on an annual basis, identifies the market change for its comparable 
benchmark positions. This involves determining a new average minimum and average 
maximum salary range for each benchmark position and, subsequently, a new 75th 
percentile based on this range. The maximum market adjustment is limited to five 
percent; however, each benchmark position will vary in how much its specific market
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has moved in a given year. For instance, some markets may move only a fraction of a 
percent while others may move several percents; thus, different benchmark positions 
will receive different annual raises. In addition to any market adjustments, employees 
are provided an annual step increase of 3.63%. The step increase helps ensure that 
employees move through their respective salary range.
Given these very generous compensation adjustments, the overall average wage 
increase for St. Charles’s employees since the inception of its efficiency-wage-based 
compensation system has been slightly greater than eight percent. It should be 
cautioned, however, that not every employee receives an eight-percent raise annually; 
rather, the system average is eight percent. Regardless, considering current economic 
conditions where the annual cost of living increases by approximately three percent per 
annum, this reflects a large pay raise for the city’s employees.
The impetus behind St. Charles’s decision to move toward this compensation 
strategy was two-fold. First, in the mid- to late 1990s, the city’s elected officials 
perceived a need to further professionalize the bureaucracy. This included the creation 
of a city administrator position via ordinance as well as relinquishing the day-to-day 
municipal operations to that individual. Second, during the same period, the city was 
experiencing tremendous growth in terms of population and economic development. 
Once again, elected officials were faced with a choice regarding the future direction of 
the municipality. Thus, in conjunction with the newly hired city administrator, the 
decision was made to become a regional service leader. In order to achieve this, the city 
believed it was necessary to undertake an effort to both attract and retain high-quality 
personnel to the organization. From these early considerations, an efficiency-wage-
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based compensation strategy was born. Simply put, above-average wages were seen as 
the best way to attract and retain an above-average workforce.
The City of St. Charles faced very few obstacles or barriers during the 
development and implementation of its compensation strategy. Within the organization, 
employees were happy to receive such vaunted wage increases, which, in most 
instances, amounted to an initial percentage increase in the double digits. Employees 
were made aware of the city’s lofty wage strategy as well as what would be expected in 
terms of individual and organizational performance and productivity. Outside the 
organization, engaged citizenry did not attempt to derail or alter the plan. Rather, many 
shared a sentiment similar to the city; namely, above-market wages would ensure a 
highly qualified and motivated workforce. It appears that the move toward an 
efficiency-wage-based compensation strategy was aided by the demographic make-up 
and economic viability of the community. Moreover, the elected officials, 
administration, and employees were highly in favor of adopting this newfound strategy. 
Figuratively, a “perfect storm” of a positive variety was taking shape.
In order for an efficiency wage strategy to continue, the political environment 
and organizational culture must remain favorable. The administration and elected board 
must believe that a high-wage strategy actually produces desirable organizational 
outcomes, such as better applicant pools and lower turnover. In a similar vein, 
employees must continue to view their relative wage rate as a “gift,” which is taken in 
exchange for the “gift” of improved work norms and increased performance and 
productivity (Akerlof, 1982, 1984). In addition, the political environment must be able 
to weather eventual changes in the elected board, which may result in a set of new
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policy directives or goals. Finally, efficiency wage requires economic viability. If a 
community’s economic development becomes stagnant or declines, maintaining a high- 
wage strategy may become a fiscal liability.
Since implementing its compensation strategy, St. Charles has faced each of the 
aforementioned factors to varying degrees. For instance, the administration and elected 
officials do believe that the city’s high-wage strategy produces tangible outputs, which 
is supported by anecdotal evidence and a city-sponsored citizen survey. To elaborate, 
during the interview process, both the city administrator and mayor strongly asserted 
that they experienced a marked increase in the value and quantity of applicant pools 
(B. Townsend, personal communication, January 26, 2007; D. DeWitte, personal 
communication, February 2, 2007). This sentiment was echoed by the public works 
director when he described the quality and breadth of applications received during a 
recent attempt to hire an electrical engineer - a position in strong demand among public- 
and private-sector organizations (M. Koenen, personal communication, January 31, 
2007). With regards to the citizen survey, the mayor cited the twice-yearly survey 
instrument as a valuable data source used to provide evidence in support of the high- 
wage strategy. Generally speaking, the survey assesses citizen input pertaining to a 
wide range of municipal services, where, on average, 98.6% of the citizens either 
“approve” or “strongly approve” of the level and quality of services provided.
It is interesting to note that an important aspect of St. Charles’s compensation 
program is the belief that performance appraisal instruments, designed to formally 
assess individual performance and productivity, are unnecessary. Rather, in accordance 
with efficiency wage theory, the city administrator believes such instruments would
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increase personnel costs while providing relatively little information of substantive 
value. Moreover, the city has worked hard to cultivate an organizational culture based 
on personal trust; introducing a formal performance appraisal process to this new milieu 
may lead employees to feel that this trust has been breeched.
With regards to how employees view their relative wage rate as a “gift,” the city 
was found to devote only a small amount of time and energy to promoting or reminding 
employees of its relative wage position in the market. The shared belief held by 
administration is that employees are generally aware that their pay is higher than their 
counterparts in neighboring communities. However, it has become evident that some 
employees within the organization lack a full understanding of their relative pay 
position. For example, the city administrator noted that he had received a handful of 
informal correspondence from employees questioning their level of pay. While the 
city’s employees are actually being paid at a rate that is ~ 25% higher than the 
comparable market average, employees who have contacted the city administrator 
appear to view the 75th quartile as taken out of 100%. Therefore, they are questioning 
why they are expected to put forth 100% of their effort when the city is only willing to 
pay for, in their eyes, 75% of their effort (B. Townsend, personal communication, 
January 26, 2007). This suggests a fundamental misunderstanding regarding the city’s 
wage strategy.
St. Charles has also undergone a number o f  organizational and political changes 
since initially implementing its compensation strategy. The city’s first professional 
administrator retired and was subsequently replaced in 2005. In addition, the dynamic 
on the elected board has shifted, as a new mayor and several new board members have
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recently been elected to office. The city has also experienced changes in its economic 
development. Specifically, over the past two years, tax revenues have flattened out, 
causing a fundamental shift in policy from continued growth toward redevelopment. In 
light of these uncertainties, the board is currently examining ways in which to slow the 
city’s yearly expenditures.
Re-examining the city’s compensation strategy is one possibility. In fact, the 
elected board has requested the city administrator to undertake an evaluation of the 
current compensation system. The impetus behind this request is not due to 
dissatisfaction with the system per se; rather, it is a proactive measure that will help 
ensure the city’s long-term financial stability. This, in essence, places St. Charles in a 
proverbial game of Catch-22.
On the one hand, elected and administrative officials believe that the efficiency 
wage strategy produces desirable outcomes, such as better applicant pools, lower 
turnover, and higher overall levels of performance and productivity. Moreover, city 
officials agree that the citizenry would be unlikely to accept a significant reduction in 
the level or quality of services offered. Thus, the ability to attract and retain highly 
qualified employees, for which the city’s high-wage strategy is credited with doing, is 
viewed as essential. On the other hand, elected and administrative officials fear that the 
current wage strategy will be financially difficult to sustain. St. Charles employees 
receive generous wage increases on a nearly annual basis. The em ployees v iew  such 
increases as standard and any significant reduction would likely evoke negative 
consequences.
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Therefore, the city’s officials are faced with a difficult situation. Among 
St. Charles’s officials there is little hard data indicating that the efficiency wage strategy 
produces desirable outcomes, yet they share a strong perception that it does. Moreover, 
the elected and administrative officials appear genuinely appreciative of the city’s 
employees and believe that the higher level of compensation reflects a fair exchange. 
Simply put, neither the administration, nor the elected board, is in favor of moving 
away from a high-wage strategy, even though they realize its costs need better 
containment.
Redefining the list of comparable market communities is seen as one way the 
city could maintain its high-wage strategy and at the same time reduce costs.
Currently, St. Charles compares itself to several municipalities that are much larger and 
have greater economic resources. Narrowing the list to include only those 
municipalities that are demographically or economically similar to St. Charles might 
reduce the city’s wage growth. Moreover, the city administrator is contemplating 
increasing the city’s rate of pay to the 95th quartile of this potentially new set of 
comparable market communities (B. Townsend, personal communication, January 26, 
2007). Ostensibly, this would allow St. Charles to maintain its status as a high-paying 
community and at the same time create the perception that the city is paying even 
higher wages. This strategy, however, could backfire. First, it is not known whether 
this strategy would cost less than the current system over time; it would depend 
primarily on the new list of comparable market communities. Second, any positive 
psychological benefits gained by moving from the 75th to the 95th quartile of
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comparable communities would likely be lost if  the em ployees’ actual pay did not 
increase dramatically.
If the overarching goal of the city is to reduce costs while at the same time 
maintain a high-wage strategy, it may simply be better to have fewer employees. 
Although reducing the number of employees, which could be done through natural 
attrition, might impact service levels slightly, the remaining employees would likely be 
more productive than if the city dropped its high-wage strategy in favor of paying near 
the regional average. In this sense, city officials would be able to cut costs while at the 
same time maintain what they perceive to be an effective compensation system.
Without question, the administrative staff needs to do a better a job of educating 
their employees regarding the city’s compensation strategy. Employees may 
misperceive the significance of their level of pay relative to comparable communities. 
By ensuring that everyone in the organization develops a clearer understanding of 
efficiency wage concepts, the expected organizational outcomes associated with the 
model would more likely achieve fruition. In addition, it is recommended that the city 
undertake an effort to measure the effectiveness of its current compensation strategy 
prior to taking any steps to alter it. As previously noted, elected and administrative 
officials believe the strategy yields a variety of desirable organizational outcomes. 
However, to what degree or extent the strategy is truly effective is not well known and 
much is anecdotal. By gaining an empirical understanding o f  the costs and benefits 
derived from their efficiency wage system, city officials would be better able to gauge 
whether the benefits outweigh the costs.
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Since implementing this strategy, the city has noted marked improvement in the 
size and quality of its applicant pools. Moreover, the city’s turnover or quit rate is very 
low and, by all accounts, the employees appear genuinely satisfied with the 
organization. The city enjoys a strong reputation for service quality, as indicated by 
citizen surveys as well as the peer assessment undertaken in this study. Finally, there 
appears to be a high level of trust within the organization. Employees are not subjected 
to formal performance appraisals; rather, they are monitored through informal methods, 
such as verbal coaching.
Ultimately, the City of St. Charles’s experience with its compensation strategy 
appears to affirm, to some extent, the model for improved organizational outcomes. 
While no specific hypothesis testing was undertaken, there is little doubt that St.
Charles possesses the cultural and innovative qualities necessary to successfully carry 
out an efficiency wage strategy. As previously discussed, future research should focus 
on the less tangible, intervening variables contained in the model. In addition, this case 
study adds a greater degree of context, as well as insight, to the empirical findings 
discussed in Chapter IV. Many of the observations made during the case study analysis 
support the aggregate survey data findings.
The following section is intended to conclude the discussion of this research. 
Questions surrounding the future of compensation in the public sector and how 
efficiency wage may fit into the picture are outlined. Finally, a basis for future research 
and ideas for others to follow up on that which has already been completed are 
provided.
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During the 1970s and 1980s, merit pay emerged as an impetus for increasing 
employee performance and productivity. In order to measure performance on an 
individual basis, the utilization of a formal method of performance appraisal was 
viewed as best. Initially, the idea of objective performance appraisals carried out by 
trained specialists was attractive to organizational leaders, as it would help to ensure the 
fair and equitable treatment of all employees. However, performance appraisals have, 
in the large majority of cases, failed to effectively differentiate individual employee 
performance in a meaningful way. Raters commit a panoply of measurement errors, 
with the most common being positive halo error, where employees are systematically 
overrated (Latham & Wexley, 1981). Given that performance appraisal instruments 
suffer from a host of problems, merit pay has fizzled as an effective compensation tool 
in the public sector (Gabris, 1998). Thus, while merit pay, in various guises, remains a 
popular tool because of its perceived ability to control and punish inept employees, it 
has, for all intents and purposes, lost its sheen. In fact, according to Nigro, Nigro, and 
Kellough (2007), the era of building compensation systems on strictly merit principles, 
designed primarily to regulate and restrict behavior, is largely waning.
However, reflecting on the results from a survey of ICMA members, Hays and 
Kearny (2001) concluded, “Public personnel administration remains in a state of flux 
and turbulence. Change has become a constant in the practice of [human resources 
management] as reform proceeds apace across virtually every conceivable front” (p. 
595). At the forefront of this reform are ways in which the public sector can utilize
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compensation to improve organizational outcomes. Undoubtedly, public-sector 
organizations will continue to experience political and fiscal pressures to increase 
performance and productivity while maintaining an ever-leaner bottom line.
In an effort to meet such pressures, the use of compensation strategies, such as 
skill-based pay or pay bands, has increased in the public sector. As discussed in 
Chapter I, under a skill-based system, employees are rewarded horizontally through the 
expansion of their knowledge, skills, and abilities that facilitate their specific job 
expertise. Pay bands create a much wider pay range for hiring employees at 
competitive market rates. This, in turn, expands the flexibility of public organizations 
to be more competitive in complex labor markets. Another compensation strategy 
beginning to appear in the public sector is gainsharing. Gainsharing rewards employees 
as members of workgroups that contribute to an organization’s performance and 
productivity. More specifically, gainsharing encourages employees within their 
workgroups to develop new methods and approaches to problem solving and, in turn, 
share in the cost savings resulting from such efforts (Graham-Moore & Ross, 1990). 
From an organizational perspective these compensation strategies make sense, as they 
grant organizations the flexibility to recruit, retain, and reward employees. However, 
whether these strategies correlate with significant increases in organizational 
performance in the public sector has yet to be the subject of extensive empirical 
research.
The findings presented in this study provide moderate support for the 
application of a high-wage compensation strategy in the public sector. Specifically, 
within the Chicagoland region, efficiency wage rates were found to be a significant
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predictor of higher reputational service quality, all else equal. Higher wages were also 
found to be a significant predictor of increased wage costs per employee. This finding, 
however, does not take into account the more subtle cost-saving factors likely 
associated with higher wages. Unfortunately, there was no definitive evidence in 
support of the hypotheses regarding turnover rates or accountability control 
mechanisms. Regardless, public-sector organizations considering the adoption of a new 
compensation model would be prudent to consider the potential benefits of a strategy 
based on efficiency wage theory.
The case study presented earlier in this chapter described how the City of 
St. Charles, Illinois, actually implemented an efficiency wage compensation strategy 
that was designed to accomplish specific goals. Anecdotally, the city’s administrative 
and elected officials feel the strategy has worked, even though they lack hard empirical 
evidence to verify their assumptions. Readers, however, should note that the strategy 
implemented by St. Charles reflects only one way in which a high-wage compensation 
model might be deployed. As previously noted, there exist numerous potential 
alternatives that public-sector organizations could consider.
As this research has suggested in many places, the calculation of the practical 
compensation market is fundamental. Public-sector organizations could experiment 
with different market models mathematically in order to ascertain a plausible fit 
between where in the market an organization would like to rank in relation to its 
financial resources. A market model that satisfies the efficiency wage assumptions of 
one organization may vary substantially from another. A partial efficiency wage system 
may also be attempted. For instance, this may involve calculating benchmark salaries at
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higher than average market rates but also coupling these with additional pay incentives, 
such as skill-based pay, cost-of-living adjustments, or performance bonuses. The key is 
to identify, as closely as possible, the “tipping point” at which most employees 
experience a need to increase their performance due to what is perceived as a fair 
exchange for their pay.
As was observed in St. Charles, some employees believe they are being paid 
only 75% of what other employees in similar positions receive. This belief causes them 
to question whether they should produce at only a 75% performance rate. While in this 
instance the employees’ reasoning is incorrect, perception can be as important as reality. 
If efficiency wage systems are to work, the employees under them must feel the system 
is treating them better than average. Only then might they feel compelled to perform 
above the norm.
The future of compensation in the public sector appears promising. In local 
government, elected and administrative officials will continue to seek new methods by 
which to attract and retain quality employees. This brings to bear the fact that no single, 
all-encompassing compensation model exists. As more public-sector organizations 
begin to utilize general high-wage concepts, customizing these concepts to better fit 
specific organizational needs, a greater understanding of the specific kinds of models 
leading to performance-based tipping points will be gained. Given that continued 
pressure will be levied on public-sector organizations to provide higher levels of service 
while maintaining low costs, this research should persuade elected and administrative 
officials to realize the importance of considering their organization’s relative position in 
the regional labor market.
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Ultimately, it is hoped that a predictive model of improved organizational 
outcomes associated with efficiency wage can be found. This research lays the 
foundation for future endeavors encompassing the entire picture of public-sector 
compensation. Undoubtedly, more work needs to be done. The predictive power of the 
model needs to be tested in additional labor markets. The role of each independent 
variable in the empirical models presented need to be confirmed through further 
analysis; in addition, questions regarding turnover or quit rate and accountability 
control mechanisms need to be addressed. The scope of future research should also be 
expanded to include culturally based intervening variables, as the extent to which an 
efficiency wage strategy is able to function in the public sector may largely be 
dependent on the overall culture of the organization.
As noted at the outset of the dissertation: compensation matters. By viewing 
compensation strategies as complex and multifaceted, it helps illuminate the fact that 
there are no easy answers to the questions posed in this study. Regardless, public-sector 
organizations can ill-afford to neglect their compensation strategy; rather, it should be 
viewed as the crux to improved organizational outcomes.
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Benchmark Jobs Surveyed
1. City Administrator or Manager




6. Accounts Payable/Receivable or Billing Clerk
7. City Planner
8. Code Inspector
9. Public Works Director or Superintendent
10. Maintenance Worker (Public Works)
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7. Parks and Recreation
8. Code Enforcement
9. Financial Management
10. Human Resources Management
11. Information Technology Systems
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Note: Thank you for participating in the municipal salary and fringe benefits survey. 
Please answer the survey questions in the space provided to the right of the question.
Title M inim um M axim um








Accts. Payable/Receivable or Billing 
Clerk/Recentionist





Maintenance Worker (Public Works)
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I .  G e n e r a l  i n f o r m a t i o n
1) Size (in dollars) of Municipal General Fund?________ _________________________________
2) Gender o f current City Manager/Administrator? ________ Male _______ Female
3) Total number of full-time employees? _________________________________
4) What is the percentage o f minority employees in 
relation to total employees in your organization?
(Do not count white females in this calculation) _________________________________
5) Does your municipality utilize an Affirmative Action
policy for employee recruitment? (yes/no) _________________________________
6) How many employees resigned from their positions
in 2004? _________________________________
7) What is the total number of new employees
hired during 2004? _________________________________
I I .  C o m p e n s a t i o n  I n f o r m a t i o n
8) How do employees move through their pay ranges 
(i.e., steps, cost of living adjustment (COLA), across 
the board, or combination)? Please explain.
9) How many salary adjustments are non-union 
employees eligible for each year?
10) Does your plan have a merit or bonus component? 
(yes/no)
11) If so, how are merit raises or bonuses determined 
(i.e., performance appraisal scores)? Please explain.
12) What are the sizes (percent) and amounts (dollars) 
of bonuses available?
13) Are bonuses provided as a lump sum or additions 
to base pay? Please explain.
14) Does your plan offer any kind o f non-monetary 
incentives? (yes/no)
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15) If so, please explain what those incentives are 
(i.e., vacation days, awards, etcetera).
16) Does your plan offer any kind o f group incentives 
or gain sharing opportunities? (yes/no)
17) If so, please explain what those incentives are.
18) How regularly, if at all, are the employees surveyed 
regarding their attitude toward the municipality’s 
compensation philosophy?
19) When is the last time your municipality conducted 
a salary survey?
20) How frequently does your municipality conduct a 
salary survey and how many other municipalities were 
included in the most recent survey?
21) Which o f the following compensation philosophies 
best describes your community?
A. We strive to pay at a higher overall rate than 
other comparable municipalities in the region;
B. We strive to pay at the mean/average rate;
C. We pay below the mean/average rate;   Answer
D. We do not have a compensation philosophy.
22) To what degree do union contracts and pay increases 
influence the compensation and pay increases of non-union 
(exempt) employees in your municipality?
A. A great deal;
B. To some extent;
C. Little;
D. Not at all;   Answer
E. Not applicable.
23) To what degree do local economic/business conditions 
influence your municipality’s pay system?
A. A great deal;
B. To some extent;
C. Little;   Answer
D. Not at all.
24) To what degree is the pay system in your municipality 
a political issue with the board/council?
A. A great deal;
B. To some extent;
C. Little;   Answer
D. Not at all.
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25) Does your municipality utilize some form o f job 
evaluation to determine internal equity? (yes/no)
26) If so, what type o f job evaluation tool (i.e., factor 
point, position classification, ranking, Hay method, 
etcetera) is currently being used? Please explain.
27) Does your municipality take internal equity 
(i.e., internal value o f jobs relative to other jobs)
into account when determining pay? (yes/no) _______________
28) If so, how does your municipality adjust for internal
equity through compensation? _______________
29) Does your pay plan include an annual cost o f living
(COLA) increase? (yes/no) _______________
30) If yes, what was the most recent percent adjustment?_______________
31) Does your municipality give pay increases based
on skill-based pay? (yes/no) _______________
32) If an employee is unhappy with his/her pay increase
is there a formal appeals process in place? (yes/no) _______________
III . PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL
33) Does your municipality have a formal written 
performance appraisal/evaluation program?
(yes/no) _______________
34) If so, what type o f performance appraisal 
instrument does your municipality use? Trait based;
A. Trait based;   Answer
B. Management by Objectives (MBO);
C. Other or combination of (please explain).
35) How frequent are these evaluations made? _______________
I V . U n i o n
36) What is the number o f unions represented in your
m unicipality? __________________
37) Which department(s) does a union formally represent?_____________
38) What is the average annual pay increase for the
employees under a union contract? _______________
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V .  M e d i c a l  a n d  T i m e - O f f  B e n e f i t s
39) What is the average out-of-pocket cost for employees 
for health insurance coverage?
For the employee only:_________________________________
For family coverage: ___
Sick Leave
40) Does your municipality have a formal sick leave 
policy? (yes/no) ___
41) Does your municipality have an incentive program
to reward employees for unused sick leave? (yes/no) ___
42) If so, what is the conversion/value o f the
incentive program? ___
43) What was the total number of sick days used
by exempt, full-time employees during FY 2004? ___
Vacation
44) How many months must an employee work 
for the municipality before he/she may use
vacation leave? ___
45) How many days per year of vacation are 
granted to employees who have the following 
lengths o f service?
1. 1 year ---------------------------------------►__________
2. 5 years ---------------------------------------► ___
3. 10 years ----------------------------------- ^  ___
4. 20 years _______________________ ^  ___
Maternity Leave
46) Does your municipality have a maternity leave policy? 
(yes/no) ___
47) If so, are all employees, regardless o f sex, eligible
for maternity leave? (yes/no) ___
Funeral Leave
48) If funeral leave is granted, what is the maximum number 
of days, with pay, an employee may take? ___
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V I .  E d u c a t i o n a l  I n c e n t i v e s
49) Does your municipality reimburse employees who 
acquire supplemental education? (yes/no) __
50) Are courses required to be job related? (yes/no) __
51) If reimbursement is provided for tuition, what % does 
the municipality pay? __
52) If reimbursement is provided for books and materials, 
what % does the municipality pay?___________________ __
V I I .  P r o f e s s i o n a l  D e v e l o p m e n t
53) Are yearly appropriations made for professional 
development or training? (yes/no) __
54) If yes, is there a cap amount on how much an 
employee may receive? __
55) Are all employees eligible for professional development 
funding? (yes/no) __




Please email the completed survey to Trent Davis attdavis2@niu.edu or fax 815-753-2539. 
You may also mail the survey to my attention at: Division of Public Administration, Northern 
Illinois University, DeKalb, IL 60115.
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APPENDIX E
REPUTATIONAL SERVICE QUALITY QUESTIONNAIRE




1) The following survey is designed to identify municipalities (other than your 
own) within your regional network that excel in the delivery of one or more 
service areas. You are not being asked to rank these municipalities, but to 
identify those municipalities and the service area(s) that stand out to you in your 
role as a professional administrator.
2) The survey is comprised of two parts. Part 1 (labeled PI) asks you to identify 
municipalities within your “regional network” that deliver “particularly high 
quality service” in one or more service areas.
>  Regional Network is defined as those municipalities that employ a 
professional administrator that you have an opportunity to meet and 
interact with on a regular or semi-regular basis. It is anticipated that you 
routinely compare and contrast aspects of your municipality (such as the 
delivery of services) with the members of your regional network. 
Interaction may occur informally, such as through a weekly or monthly 
managers’ luncheon, or it may occur formally, such as through a 
professional meeting or conference. Your regional network may be 
comprised of neighboring or nearby municipalities, or it may consist of 
municipalities farther away in distance. Also, your regional network 
may consist of municipalities larger or smaller in population, municipal 
general fund, service offerings, or personnel.
>  Particularly High Quality Service is defined as a service area that, in 
your professional opinion, stands out above most or all other 
municipalities offering a similar service. The service is of the quality 
that it could be considered as a benchmark or model for other 
municipalities to follow. For example, you may believe that Community 
X excels in the delivery of its police services and, therefore, is seen as 
offering particularly high quality service in this area.
3) Part 2 (labeled P2) asks for any additional insight that you might be able to 
provide which will help me to better understand the type of regional network 
you belong to and your interaction with other network members.
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Municipality:____________________________________________________
Name and Title: _________________________________________________
E m a i l : ____________________________________________________
Based on your professional knowledge and experience, please identify 
those municipalities in your “regional network” that are known for 
delivering particularly high quality service in one or more service areas. 
List each municipality and the service area(s) below. If  a municipality is 
known for delivering generally high quality services overall, list the name 
o f the municipality followed by “all services” (e.g., Dayton -  all services). 
All services include: Police, Fire, Public Works, Planning, Administration, 
Economic Development, Parks and Recreation, Code Enforcement, 












Please provide any additional comments you may have which will help me 
to better understand the type o f regional network you belong to or your 
interaction with other network members.
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APPENDIX F
COMPARABLE COMMUNITIES FOR THE CITY OF ST. CHARLES, ILLINOIS
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1. Addison 13. Lombard
2. Arlington Heights 14. Mount Prospect
3. Batavia 15. Naperville
4. Bensenville 16. Palatine
5. Bolingbrook 17. Rolling Meadows
6. Carol Stream 18. Romeoville
7. Crystal Lake 19. Schaumburg
8. Des Plaines 20. Villa Park
9. Downers Grove 21. Westmont
10. Elk Grove Village 22. Wheaton
11. Elmhurst 23. Woodridge
12. Hoffman Estates
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